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ABSTRACT 
With a rapidly changing environment of industrial safety legislation in New 
Zealand, all of the country's process industries will be required to appraise the 
hazards on their sites by 1993. Currently, overseas techniques are available, but 
their complexity, expense and data requirements make them inappropriate for 
most New Zealand indtlstry. In this project, a methodology for hazard 
appraisal was designed to analyse and quantify hazards on process sites. The 
methodology was then encoded into software for ease of application. To be 
useful for the wide range of New Zealand industry, the software had to be easy 
to use, able to run using a minimum of crude data and able to run on 
inexpensive hardware. 
The software was produced and found to give valid results from the crude data 
used. When its results were compared to those from an analysis using an 
internationally recognised method, they were found to be within the limits of 
expectation, considering the fundamental differences in approach. While the 
internationally accepted method was seen to be more reliable, the project 
method was found to give real~stic rankings, that would be useful to a wide 
range of New Zealand Industry. The method of rapid ranking used would 
highlight potentially hazardous areas on a site and help raise the awareness of 
industrial hazards in the users of the method. There were several modifications 
specified, whose application to the project software would improve the quality 
of results. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
Over the last decade, there have been many changes in the quality and 
application of New Zealand's industrial safety. One of the key areas of change 
has been the revision of New Zealand's industrial safety legislation. These 
developments have occurred through changes in government, developments 
overseas, but the most significant factor has been changes in New Zealand 
industry. 
With the advent of the Think Big energy projects in the early eighties, New 
Zealand experienced an unparalleled development of large industrial 
installations. At this time, overseas engineering consultants involved in these 
projects expressed concern that while some safety legislation existed that would 
cover the design and operation of large and complex plants, it was not 
comprehensive, nor was it able to deal effectively with the large-scale 
processing of hazardous substances occurring in these plants. 
In 1983, the Accident Compensation Corporation (then Commission) initiated 
discussions between the Departments of Labour and Health and the Ministries 
of Energy and Transport, as the agencies responsible for industrial safety. The 
aim of these discussions were to develop the basis of hazard evaluation. 
Hazard analysis had been developed overseas in the years following the 
Flixborough disaster in 1974 (Lees 1980) and had been employed by Liquigas 
Ltd to evaluate the safety levels of its proposed operations with bulk LPG 
(Uquid Fuels Trust Board, 1982). As a result of these discussions, it was 
concluded that hazards surveys for new projects should be a part of the 
Environmental Impact Report and that safety audit procedures covering the 
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commissioning of new plants should be invoked immediately by the 
Department of Labour. 
Since 1983, several other government committees with similar representation 
have discussed further, the implementation of hazard assessments into the 
operation of major industries. Parallel to this, these committees discussed 
changes necessary in New Zealand's industrial safety legislation to bring it all 
under one authority, as recommended by Walker (1981) and earlier 
commissions of inquiry (New Zealand Commission For Inquiry, 1975). It was 
felt that the best interests of the worker in New Zealand.were not being served 
by the segmentation of the country's safety legislation. It was also considered 
that proposed hazard appraisal legislation could only be made pursuant to one 
encompassing piece of legislation because of the diversity of expertise and 
statutory coverage required. Work on the hazard appraisal legislation 
continued in preparation for this new Act. 
In 1987 the first draft piece of legislation requiring major industrial installations 
to carry out hazard analysis was prepared and circulated widely for comment 
Subsequent drafts attempted to bring New Zealand in line with the Control of 
Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations (Health and Safety Executive, 
1985), which was similar legislation enacted in the United Kingdom. This was 
an effort to reflect a successful overseas practice in legislating requirements for 
formal industrial hazard appraisal. In the years that followed, revised hazard 
appraisal drafts were circulated, each with minor changes in their accent. to 
reflect the changing attitudes on compulsory hazard appraisal. 
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) service of the Department of Labour 
came into existence in 1988. It was one of five business units with the 
Department of Labour that had been split into a discrete organisation. This 
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change was intended to streamline the operations of those organisations and 
raise their independent profiles within the community. The operational arm of 
the OSH service is represented by its inspectorate, which checks compliance 
with the enacted legislation, investigate accidents and bring prosecutions where 
breaches of legislation have occurred. 
-
In 1989, the then Labour government introduced into Parliament, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Bill. This was the first attempt to have one Act 
empowering one authority. The Bill was not enacted before the change in 
government in 1990. The incoming government recognised the need for a 
revision in industrial safety and health legislation, but wished to put into place 
legislation that fitted its philosophy of deregulation and introduced a new Bill. 
In October, 1992 the new Health and Safety in Employment Act, 1992 
(Parliamentary Counsel Office, 1992b) received royal ascent and was enacted. 
Instead of a factory owner with a health and safety problem having to deal with 
different agencies empowered by different pieces of legislation with the 
potential for conflicting requirements, the OSH service of the Department of 
Labour will now co-ordinate all activity relating to safety and health in the 
workplace. The new Act has drawn together health and safety legislation and 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Transport, Accident Compensation and 
Rehabilitation and Insurance Corporation, Area Health Boards, Department of 
Health and Ministry of Commerce, to join those already administered by the 
Department of Labour. 
With the change in government in 1990, the direction of health and safety 
policies changed significantly. To reflect the policies of the current government, 
the proposed hazard analysis standard has been changed from mandatory 
regulations into a code of practice. The proposed code will offer a means to 
compliance with the new Act, recognising that there is more than one route 
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toward satisfactory safety management. In the new Act, there are a series of 
sections dealing specifically with hazard appraisal. For the first time, New 
Zealand safety legislation will require employers to identify the hazards within 
their workplaces and then to institute measures to eliminate, isolate or reduce 
those hazards and to minimise their potential effects. Thus, it will be a statutory 
requirement for all factories to carry out formal hazard evaluations of their 
facilities. 
1.2 Nature and Scope of Project 
With the widespread use of computers, use of safety assurance software is 
becoming an increasingly popular way of quickly analysing hazards at a given 
site. The aim of this project was to prepare safety assurance software for 
quantitative analysis, applicable to the New Zealand industrial scene. Other 
safety assurance software packages are currently available for use in New 
Zealand, but because of the cost, are generally only used in the larger 
installations. To be useful to the main proportion of New Zealand industry, any 
software produced had to be simple to use, inexpensive and appropriate to the 
scale and nature of the likely hazards. The software also had to be able to 
operate with a minimal amount of crude data. Because of the scale of New 
Zealand's industrial activity, data related to industrial safety are sparse. There 
is a need to assemble relevant New Zealand data, perhaps within a national 
database, rather than rely on existing data in the open literature and in 
commercial databases. These data relate to large scale industrial activities, often 
near large residential populations, and to management practices differing from 
those in New Zealand. 
With relatively simple software, there was expected to be a trade off with a 
corresponding quality of analysis, Thus the second part of the project was to 
evaluate the software. Software produced had to be validated against an 
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internationally used methods to at least show that the methodology used and 
application were within the limits of expectation. Through this comparison, the 
inherent limitations of the software were also to be evaluated. 
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2.0 .SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODS 
2.1 Introduction 
The terms 'risk' and 'hazard' are often confused, while the term 'risk' is used 
when dealing with hazardous events in industrial installations as well as the 
incidence of adverse events in financial and other matters. 
In this thesis, a 'hazard' shall be defined as a situation, substance, phenomenon 
or activity that has an actual or potential ability to cause harm. Risk is 
generally considered to be the likelihood of an undesired event within a given 
period (Health and Safety Executive, 1989). It may be expressed either as a 
frequency (the number of specified events in a unit time) or as a probability 
(the probability of a specified event following a prior event), depending on the 
circumstances (International Labour Office, 1991). In it simplest form, risk is 
calculated by multiplying frequencies of failures (leading to hazardous events) 
by a numerical estimation of the consequences of that hazard. 
The terms hazard analysis and risk assessment are used interchangeably in 
texts, and essentially they refer· to the quantitative evaluation of hazards. In 
determining the safety of a particular site, the hazards are analysed so that the 
risk of a lack of safety can be assessed. In this thesis, hazard analysis is the 
preferred term. The risk on a site can change easily with a new shift of 
operational staff or a change in climate while the hazard potential remains 
constant. 
Keey (1992) prefers the definition of risk as the probability of a specific hazard 
<becoming hazardous). The specified consequence arising, should that hazard 
occur, is termed 'outcome' and Keey defines 'hazardousness' as a function of 
'risk' and 'outcome', as previously defined. This method moves away from the 
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classical risk definitions and uses the term 'risk' as only a contributing factor to 
the term 'hazardousness'. This avoid the problem of calculating risk at high-
hazard, low-risk installations such as nuclear power plants. For a loss of coolant 
accident, the classical risk function is a function of near zero frequency and near 
infinite consequence. This leads to a higher uncertainty of the risk result, and 
thus diminishes the value of that result for further analysis. 
2.2 Qualitative Methods 
There are two types of method of hazard analysis, qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The qualitative method adopts a structured, holistic approach to a 
systems analysis. An example of a qualitative assessment is a checklist. A 
checklist normally contains all of the elements of a good safety management 
system. Plant management may get a perspective of the magnitude of risk in an 
installation by checking the installation's safety management system against the 
elements on the checklist to rate their safety performance. 
The use of checklists in qualitative risk assessment can be extended into the 
auditing of plant safety. This is one of the most commonly used methods of 
safety assurance. The plant is usually audited against a series of criteria 
deemed necessary for safe management. These criteria or fundamental 
elements of safety are usually set as points or questions to be asked of site 
management and employees. Audit procedures such as the International Safety 
Rating System (ISRS) have set up worldwide standards for safety management 
quality. Safety audit standards have also been embedded into corporate 
strategies. The only concern with audit procedures is that sometimes adherence 
to the letter of the audit requirement is seen as more important that adhering to 
the basic tenets of good safety management. 
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The Hazard and Operability study, also known as HAZOP is an open ended 
qualitative procedure for identifying complex failure scenarios that involve 
multiple independent events (Gressel and Gideon, 1991). The technique is 
applied in a group that seeks contribution from technical professions on and off 
site that have useful knowledge about the process to be analysed. This group 
may include mechanical, chemical and electrical engineers as well as chemists, 
and operational staff. 
The plant is first split into small process units. The group involved in the 
analysis then considers the effects of a series of process deviations on the unit in 
question, usually working off a process and instrumentation diagram .. The 
group will recommend improvements to the unit, depending on the likelihood 
and consequences of those deviations. The HAZOP is one of the most powerful 
techniques used to identify potential hazards. It is used in many stages of a 
plant's operating life from its conception on the drawing board and through all 
its proposed modifications. 
2.3 Quantitative Methods 
Quantitative analysis is the method of assigning risk values to hazardous 
situations. It is generally termed quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and is also 
a widely used method. The numbers attributed to the 'risk' of a system are 
useful for comparisons with; other systems, the same system after a period of 
time or after modifications have taken place, and to defined risk acceptability 
criteria. Corran (1987) states that the quantitative assessment of process plants 
is extremely valuable because it enables the risks to be appreciated by those 
only peripherally interested in the technicalities. With a large proportion of 
boards of directors, etc. having minimal technical experience, this point is very 
important. Aside from the differences in definitions, the classical methodology 
of a quantitative method conforms generally to that shown in Figure 2.1. Note 
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that a qualitative method plays a part in the analysis, with a holistic 
identification of the hazards which arise at a given site. 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
' ..... IDENTIFY HAZARDS p 
' 
REVISE DESIGN 
consequences OK OR PROCEDURE WORSE CONSEQUENCES ... 
... 
(qualitative assessment) 
A ... I REDUCE I 
I I f 
IDENTIFY ACCIDENT 
INITIATING EVENTS 
ESTIMATE PROBABILITIES probability OK ... 
... 
OF INITIATING EVENTS 
-
I REDUCE l I 
I I 
' IDENTIFY ACCIDENT EVENT SEQUENCES 
' 
probability and 
ESTIMATE PROBABILITY consequence OK .... 
AND CONSEQUENCES 
-
OF EVENT SEQUENCES 
I REDUCE I .... I 
- I I 
' not OK DETERMINE RISK ACCEPTABILITY 
,roK 
OPERATE SYSTEM 
. 
0 Ftgure 2.1 Steps In Quantitative Risk Assessment (Pickford and Corran, 1986) 
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While Figure 2.1 shows the classical methodology for a quantitative method, 
there are many techniques available to apply the methodology. These 
techniques are of varying levels of sophistication and are designed to achieve 
different ends. 
A complex analysis of a 'plant will require the use of several different 
techniques. These techniques can be represented by task boxes in the 
methodology diagram in Figure 1. 
Fault tree analysis (Hope 1984a) is a method that estimates the likelihood of a 
particular adverse outcome. This event is first placed at the top of the fault tree. 
The next step is to define all of the causative events that could have contributed 
to that top event. Once these events are defined (and the events contributing to 
those, etc.), probabilities and frequencies for the bottom events are set. Using 
Boolean operations, all higher event likelihoods are calculated, up to the 
likelihood of the initially defined top event. The sequence of events is simplifies 
to give a minimum cut set to produce the specified outcome. 
This method is especially useful for tracking the relative impacts of contributing 
events to identify areas worthy of modification. The analysis can also be used 
in accident investigation (Barker 1990) to systematically identify possible events 
that have already caused a top event incident. The major limitation of fault tree 
analysis is that due to the number of combinations of possible lower level 
events it can be subject to error, as some pathways to failure can be easily 
overlooked. 
Failure modes and effects analysis (or FEMA) uses a similar approach to fault 
tree analysis (Gressel and Gideon, 1991), except that the analysis starts with an 
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individual component and then assesses the consequences of that component 
failing. The failure is essentially set as the bottom event in the analysis. The 
major advantage of this method is that all failure possibilities for that 
component are identified. Those with significant consequences can be flagged 
for further analysis. While the method is rigorous for that component, it does 
not evaluate the effects of two or more component failures. 
The Monte Carlo Method (Hurst 1989) uses a similar modelling process as fault 
tree analysis, but takes into account the uncertainties involved in risk 
estimation. Instead of a fixed value estimated for likelihoods and other 
contributing factors, values are given in a range. Using random number 
generation to give values within the set ranges, a risk calculation is repeatedly 
executed (usually on a computer) to give a statistical distribution of the risk 
values. These data can be approximated to known statistical distributions, and 
ancillary statistical data such as variance can be used to evaluate the accuracy of 
risk values used. 
While techniques such as FMEA and fault tree analysis estimate modes and 
likelihood of failure, other methods are necessary to estimate the consequences 
of these failures. A consequence is a physical manifestation of a hazardous 
situation. In the case of a propane vapour explosion, the consequence would be 
a blast wave or thermal radiation. The impact is the severity to which that 
consequence affects a target group. The target group may be persons, property 
or the environment. In the case of the propane explosion, the impact on persons 
may be numerous casualties with second or third degree burns. 
Consequence analysis is generally an empirical assessment. Quantities and 
properties of hazardous substances are assessed, alongside physical factors such 
as b' am lent temperature, wind speed, etc. Some consequence models, s~ch as 
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toxic gas dispersion are estimations derived from physical properties of 
substances (Lees 1980), while many explosion models are derived from trials 
and case studies (Major Hazard Assessment Panel1989, Technica 1985). 
Because of the complexity of the phenomena involved, good estimates need 
complex calculations which are time consuming and require a range of data. 
These data often difficult to obtain. 
Using these techniques, hazards can be analysed to quantify the risks. 
Depending on the application of those results, the techniques can be used in a 
variety of ways. The Health and Safety Executive in the.United Kingdom has 
developed a computer package called RISKAT (Hurst 1989) or RISK 
Assessment Tool. The basis of this evaluation is a dose criterion. Equivalent 
measures of harm are defined for the variety of different hazards on site. The 
notion of equivalent measures of harm follows several years experience by the 
Health and Safety Executive (Health and Safety Executive, 1989) of using a 
'dangerous dose' criterion. The 'dangerous dose' has the potential to cause 
death, but will not necessarily do so. Equivalent measures of harm are the 
preferred criteria because of the difficulty in choosing doses with similar 
degrees of danger. Equivalent·measures of harm have been derived with the 
aid of probit functions (Lees, 1980), which give a better appreciation of 
equivalent degrees of danger. 
In its hazard evaluation of a site, RISKAT calculates the likelihood of exceeding 
these dose criteria. The application of RISKA T is different from most industrial 
applications which analyse a system to estimate the risk (or potential dose) 
already existing, and then compare it to some acceptability criteria to see if 
modifications to that system are necessary. 
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3.0 SIMPLIFIED RISK EVALUATION 
3.1 Risk Ranking As A Valid Method For New Zealand 
New Zealand is a relatively small country in terms of its land area and 
population, but it has a wealth of natural resources. The commercial 
exploitation of these resources means that the country has a considerable 
breadth of process industries which are likely to increase in importance. Under 
the requirements of the Resource Management Act 1991, with its thrust towards 
sustainability and zero environmental impacts, good management of site safety 
and loss prevention is playing a bigger part of retaining plant viability. The 
costs of down-time are increasing, as are the cost of plant insurance, accident 
compensation levies (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 1992a), the punitive 
measures for unsafe work practices (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 1992b) and 
environmental degradation (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 1991). 
While some of New Zealand's larger process installations have multi-national 
backing and can provide a complex quantitative analysis of hazards on-site 
from their own resources, by far the majority can not. The size of the New 
Zealand economy makes it prohibitive. The methods use classical techniques of 
quantitative assessment, which are heavily dependant on large amounts of 
failure and other data. They also need expensive computational resources and 
expensive expertise. 
In recent years, several methods of hazard analysis have been developed that 
are easy to apply, inexpensive to use, yet still provide useful results. These 
methods involve the rapid ranking of process hazards. In essence, these 
methods use simple assessments to assign semi-quantitative values to hazards 
within a defined system. These hazards can be ranked for that particular 
system. This ranking can be used for prioritisation of planned action 
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(Chidambariah 1991) and comparative analyses with other systems or the same 
systems over a period of time. Rapid ranking of hazards allows site 
management to perceive how risks are distributed across the compartments of 
that site. These types of methods allow resources to be allocated most 
effectively in the modification of systems to reduce hazards progressively. 
3.2 A Summary Of Techniques 
Most rapid-ranking systems are based on the use of verbal descriptors to link 
hazards and their incidence with simple quantitative scores. An example of this 
is the criteria adopted in NFP A 704 " A Standard System For The Identification 
Of The Fire Hazards Of Materials" (NFP A 1990). This standard sets criteria for 
assessing the relative flammability, reactivity and health hazard of materials. 
Using descriptive criteria, materials are given scores between 0 (no hazard) and 
4 (maximum hazard). Using these scores, a quick perception can be made of the 
relative hazardousness of several substances. 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical Corp 1987) takes this type of 
ranking one step further, dividing a site into compartments with potentials for 
causing fires and explosions. The index uses the NFP A 704 material scoring 
method for substances within those compartments, and has inputs referring to 
process conditions, site topography and the use of hazard mitigation devices, to 
calculate an effective exposure radius around the selected hazardous locations 
on site. 
In his work, Lapp (1990) has devised a system that uses a variant of fault tree 
analysis to calculate risk scores. The Major Risk Index System initially sets up a 
fault tree for all failures occurring within a defined system. For each of these 
failures, an individual failure index is calculated. This calculation assumes that 
for fail a ure to become a hazardous event, three things must all happen. The 
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system must first be challenged (by the failure), then both the internal and 
external protective mechanisms must fail. Thus the individual index is seen as 
being at the top of a fault tree with an AND gate. Estimations for the frequency 
of system challenging events are multiplied by the probabilities of both each 
protective failure (see Figure 3.2.1). 
Figure 3.2.1 Individual Index Calculation (Lapp 1990) 
individual failure 
index 
These individual failure indices are treated as being independent of each other. 
The total site index is calculated using the fault-tree method through an OR 
gate. Thus the site index is the sum of the individual indices (see Figure 3.2.2). 
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site index 
individual failure 
index 1 
individual failure 
index 2 
individual failure 
index 3 
individual failure 
index n 
Figure 3.2.2 Site Index Calculation (Lapp 1990) 
3.3 Tweeddale's and Keey's Methodologies 
To fit a specific New Zealand situation at Rosebank Peninsula, Wood and 
Tweeddale (1989, GCNZ 1989) developed a methodology for determining a set 
of risk indices. The method is based on an earlier simplified analysis developed 
by ICI pic (Keey 1987). In this methodology, they assign semi-quantitative 
scores to an index equation by equating hazardous phenomena on a site to a 
score using a form of verbal descriptor. 
This equation reads 
(R) = (F) X (S) X (P) 
Where (R) the risk index is calculated by multiplying (F), the designating 
frequency of the hazard causing event by (S), the severity of consequences and 
(P) the likelihood of the incident not being mitigated. The severity of 
consequences are measured against three impact groups. These are persons, 
property and the environment. In this method, hazard indices are calculated for 
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each of these impact groups. The criteria for assigning these values are given in 
Tables 3.3.1-3.3.5 below. 
Table 3.3.1. Frequency Scale for Initiation of Incidents (F) 
(Wood and Tweeddale 1989) 
DESCRIPTION FREQUENCY PER MILLION 
PER YEAR 
Very Frequent 500000 
Likely 100000 
Possible 10000 
Unlikely 1000 
Very Unlikely 100 
Barely Credible 10 
Table 3.3.2. Scale of Severity Describing Effect on People (S) 
(Wood and Tweeddale 1989 
EFFECT SEVERITY SCORE 
Several dead Number of dead 
1 dead 1.0 
Significant chance of a fatality .8 
Small chance of a fatality or severe .3 
nuisance to many people 
Severe nuisance to a few people or a .1 
nuisance to many people 
Nuisance to a few people .01 
Minor nuisance to few people .001 
Table 3.3.3. Scale of Severity of Effect on Property (S) 
(GCNZ Consultants, 1989) 
Effect Severity Score 
Several houses destroyed Number of Houses 
Whole of adjacent factory destroyed 3-10 
One house destroyed 1 
Originating factory destroyed, 0.3 
or part of adjacent factory destroyed 
or major part of residential house 
destroyed 
Part of originating factory destroyed, 0.03-0.1 
or minor damage to adjacent factory 
or minor part of residential house 
destroyed 
Minor damage to originating factory 0.001-0.01 
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Table 3.3.4. Scale of Severity of Effect on Environment (S) 
(GCNZ Consultants, 1989) 
Effect Severity Unit 
Intense local and long term (> 12 2-10 
months) effect, or high potential for 
widespread impact 
Intense local but short term effect ( <12 1.0 
months) or moderate potential for 
widespread impact 
Moderate local and long term (> 12 0.3 
months) effect, or low potential for 
widespread impact 
Moderate local but short term ( <12 0.1 
months) effect 
Minor local short term effect (<12 0.01 
months) 
Minor local short term effect ( <3 0.001-0.003 
months) 
Table 3.3.5. Scale for Probability of Failure of Protective or Emergency 
Response (P) 
(Wood and Tweeddale 1989) 
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DESCRIPTION PROBABILITY 
Negligible chance of effective response 1.0 
Low chance of effective response .7 
Fair chance of effective response .3 
Good chance of effective response .1 
Very good chance of effective response 
.03 
._Exceptional chance of effective response 
.01 
-. 
The frequency of the hazard causing event is measured per million years, while 
the severity scale has a top scale reading of the number dead in a multiple 
fatality accident, reducing in severity to fractions of one fatality. This gives an 
index unit of expected mortalities per million years for impact to persons. 
Severity, in terms of impact to property, has the meaning of expected building 
damage per million years and that to the environment is the number of 
incidents which are likely to have a widespread effect. 
In a refinement of the work by Wood and Tweeddale, Keey (1991a) pointed out 
that in measuring the impact on people, the use of multiple and fractional 
fatalities on the same consequence scale was inappropriate. The social cost of a 
fatality and its lack of 'reversibility' meant that a fractional fatality representing 
illness or injury resulted in a mix of units on this scale. In his refined 
methodology, Keey chose as a consequence scale, a count of those persons that 
had been seriously affected by the hazard in question. Whether they are 
affected by death, illness, injury or psychologically was left implicit. With this 
scale, a wider raft of effects can be considered. While no specific criteria for 
'seriously affected' is set, it can be defined as per the requirements of the 
assessment. This approach is consistent with the use of the 'dangerous dose' by 
the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive in evaluating hazardous sites 
(Health and Safety Executive, 1989). 
Keey also suggested that the reference time interval for the designated 
frequency be reduced from one million years to one hundred. This would give 
a better perspective to analysts and those using the information without the 
benefit of a technical background, by working on the basis of a human lifetime. 
The revised frequency choices are shown in Table 3.3.6. With respect to the 
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severity of consequences to the environment, Keey suggested that the scale be 
aligned with the impacts on the number of target organisms. 
Table 3.3.6. Frequency Scale For Initiation Of Accidents (Keey 1991a) 
Descriptor Numerical Value (/per 100 years) 
Very Often 1000 (once per month) 
Often 100 (once per year) 
Likely 10 
Possible 1 (once per lifetime) 
Unlikely 0.1 
Very Unlike! y 0.01 
Barely Credible 0.001 
Keey also changed the scale for mitigation descriptors from the scale used by 
Wood and Tweeddale, which was biased toward success to a symmetrical table, 
revolving around the descriptor of a 'fair' mitigation response. This table is 
shown in Table 3.3.7. 
Table 3.3.7. Scale Of Likelihood Of Failure To Contain An Incident (Keey 
1991a) 
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Descriptor Probability of Success Probability of Failure 
Negligible chance of an effective 0 1 
response 
Low chance of an effective .2 .8 
response 
Fair chance of an effective .5 .5 
response 
Good chance of an effective .8 .2 
response 
Negligible chance that mishap 1 0 
._!Vill escalate 
Keey's equation is defined as the product; 
(incident index)= (frequency) x (numbers affected) 
x (chance of an ineffective response) 
It was decided to use the Keey methodology as a base methodology for this 
project. This was because it offered a simple form of quantitative assessment to 
New Zealand industry, was well structured, relatively easily modifiable to 
software and worthy of further application. 
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4.0 PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Features of proposed methodology 
The methodology to be used in this project was changed slightly from Keey to 
more effectively accommodate the aims of this project and its transfer into 
software. 
The methodology will be based on the equation; 
(hazard index)= (frequency) x (numbers affected) 
x (chance of an ineffective response) 
The index will be called a hazard index instead of an incident index because it is 
felt that the index is more aligned to the hazards within the plant, with an 
incident effectively being the conduit between a hazard and a hazardous 
situation. The term 'chance of ineffective response' is the probability that 
mitigation devices installed will fail, thus the terms can be used 
interchangeably. The equation closely fits the terminology used by Keey (1992). 
Based on his definitions, risk is the probability of a hazard occurring. In the 
terms of the equation above, this will be the frequency of failure multiplied by 
the chance of an ineffective emergency response. Keey then terms 
hazardousness as a function of risk and outcome. This function at its simplest is 
risk multiplied by outcome. In the above equation the outcome with respect to 
people will be the numbers affected. Thus the index will be an indication of the 
hazardousness of the site. 
The methodology within the software will concentrate on the effects the site's 
hazards have on people. This will streamline the approach and represent the 
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interest of this project's funding agencies. The application of the methodology 
to software forced no changes to the methodology, but it did give an 
opportunity to refine the methodology, using the benefits of computer 
execution. 
Of the three contributing factors to the hazard indices, the estimation of persons 
seriously affected was identified as being the most uncertain. It was decided to 
actively place personnel on a graphic image of the defined site and then run 
consequence models for each hazard to estimate the magnitude of area of the 
site that is significantly affected by those hazards. Personnel placed within an 
area 'affected' by that hazard would be considered 'seriously affected'. It was 
thought worthwhile to adopt both discrete and uniform personnel placement 
because of the different types of work they encompass. Administrative 
personnel on site will spend their whole working day in one discrete location, 
while process workers could be called upon to work anywhere on site or within 
a particular zone. In the case of sites with shiftwork, 24 hours per day, seven 
days per week, the discrete and uniform positioning of staff will reflect that 
those worker positions will be exposed to plant hazards four times longer than 
day staff. 
Numbers of people affected were estimated by assuming the effect distances to 
be radial around the hazard epicentre in question and adding up the people 
within the confines of that hazard's effect radius. It is recognised that the 
consequences of a hazard are rarely equivalent in all directions, due to the type 
of hazard, wind flow or site topography. The approximation of having circular 
effect zones was deemed valid because the term 'seriously affected' was seen as 
a range of impacts including evacuations as well as injuries, illnesses, 
psychological disorders and fatalities. This term would thus certainly envelop 
29 
the impacts experienced on both the downwind and upwind plant sections 
during a fire, toxic release or explosion, etc. 
There were two options available for the source of the consequence data. The 
data could either be derived from models programmed into the new software or 
from a commercial conseque~ce package. Considering that the consequence 
models used were going to be very similar, it was decided to avoid duplication 
and calculate consequence data off-line with a commercial package. 
Consequence data would be added at appropriate points during program 
execution in the first instance. 
As mentioned, to use the consequence routines, a graphic image of the site 
needed to be generated. This meant that the analysis could be centred on the 
site topography, with respect to the siting of the hazardous compartments and 
personnel. This approach would also give the user an appreciation of the 
magnitude of the hazards involved. The methodology described is shown in 
Figure 4.2 
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Figure ~.2 Project Methodology 
5.0 PROJECT SOFTWARE 
5.1 Reasons for implementation into software 
With a basic methodology defined, the next step was to encode that 
methodology into software. Some quantitative methodologies are put into 
software because of their complexity and the need to perform repetitive 
calculations to develop risk profiles, e.g SAFETI (Pitblado and Nalpanis, 1989). 
A computer is far faster and more accurate in complex or time consuming 
calculations, iterations and graphical representation than one or more human 
analysts. 
These were not the prime reasons to convert this methodology into software. 
Instead, it was considered that transferring the methodology into software 
would set a formalised routine for the analyst to follow. This would hopefully 
lead to better reproducibility of results for the same or other analysts, and 
provide a consistent basis for regulatory assessment of sites. 
Once the basic methodology was en.coded, other routines were added to further 
help the analyst make decisions with reference to the descriptive criteria. This 
was intended to reduce the dependence on the expertise and experience of the 
analyst. 
5.2 Choice of Programming Software 
At the beginning of the project, no specification was set for the programming 
software to be used. It was realised that the implementation of the 
methodology into code was not going to be a particularly complex process as 
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the methodology only included data entry, simple graphics, data manipulation 
and output. The basis of the project was more of an exercise in method 
evaluation than in software design. 
The main requirements for the programming software was for its ease in use 
and implementation. Considering that any end product was to be made easy to 
utilise by smaller New Zealand industries, it was also important that it could 
run on desktop microcomputers of modest performance. 
The programming software chosen was Microsoft Quick Basic. For the 
convenience the computer used for programming was an Apple Macintosh SE 
30, thus the Quick Basic used was specifically for the Macintosh range of 
computers. It is important to note that there is also a version of Microsoft Quick 
Basic available for the MS. DOS machines, and that the code is almost identical. 
While the Macintosh SE 30 is a powerful machine with a maths co-processor, 
the software will run on any Apple Macintosh and any IBM compatible 
computer with a processor at least as powerful as the XT type. The minimum 
RAM memory requirement for program execution is 512 kilobytes. 
The other advantage of Microsoft Quick Basic is that while being relatively 
simple to encode, it retains a logical structure similar to the more complex 
programming languages available. Unlike the cruder Basic forms (Basica, GW 
Basic) Quickbasic needs no line numbers and can be compiled into an 
executable file in the international standard 68020 form. Compiling is a process 
where the code is transcribed from a statement format into a machine code. 
This is advantageous for two reasons. First, the machine code is faster for the 
computer to read, so the program becomes faster to run. Secondly, the 
transcribed version does not need the programming software to be resident in 
the computer's memory for the programmed software to run. It will run as a 
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stand alone program, unlike the uncompiled version. This capability also lends 
itself to being useful for smaller industries, by circulation of the programmed 
software alone. 
5.3 The Software 
This software is run as a series of subroutines, called from a main program. 
This part of the chapter will discuss the way that these routines are called and 
how they work to calculate the hazard index of a site. The names of subroutines 
will be printed in upper case. To get a better impression of the way these 
subroutines are called, refer to Figures 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b for the flow chart of the 
project software. A listing of the project software, Hazrank can be found in 
Appendix 2, along with a list of variable explanation in Appendix 3 and quick 
reference subroutine explanations in Appendix 4 
The program starts by entering the START subroutine. Here, variables such as 
pi are initialised, arrays are dimensioned and data statements are read into the 
arrays. Data statements are used to load regularly used words or phrases into 
arrays for the use in the descriptor tables. The title screen is shown and then the 
user is asked the name of the site. Later in the program, an output file will be 
opened. The name of the file will be the same as the site name for easy referral 
to data. The date and time the file was created is saved with the file, when it is 
opened, this is useful for chronological reference. To continue beyond the 
START routine, the user must press the space bar. The space bar must be 
pushed at the end of each subroutine because in the compiled form of the 
software the repeat function in the key starts after a short time. Too much 
pressure on the return key at the end of a routine can result in a zero value 
being entered into the first entry value in the next routine. 
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The next routine is ENTERSITE. In this routine, the site boundary co-ordinates 
are entered. To ease the placement of these co-ordinates, a 10x10 grid is printed 
onto the screen, with the numbers 0 to 10 printed along each side. For each co-
ordinate, a number between 0 and 10 is entered and then changed into pixel co-
ordinates. The numbers that identify the grid lines are generated in another 
subroutine called NUMPRINT. These numbers are only 6 pixels high by 3 wide 
and can be placed accurately on the screen. This subroutine was necessary 
because the limited software graphics capability of the Quick Basic software 
meant it was only able to print numbers in a text mode at full size. Numbers 
printed in this mode were three times as large and were only able to be placed 
on the 60 character wide, 18 character high screen matrix. This made the final 
output far too cluttered and difficult to place the numbers accurately. 
NUMPRINT works by entering the value of the number, and its pixel co-
ordinates. These values go into the routine, where a pixel representation of that 
number is printed at those co-ordinates. By inputting numbers on the pixel co-
ordinates, the software was able to take advantage of more accurate placement 
in the 495 pixel wide by 295 pixel high graphics matrix. 
When the user enters boundary data, they enter any real number between 0 and 
10. At each co-ordinate point, a 2 pixel by 2 pixel black square is plotted. After 
each co-ordinate entry, lines are drawn to connect the all co-ordinate points 
entered so far. The software assumes that any boundary will be a closed shape, 
so after the second to last entry has been specified, a boundary line will be 
automatically drawn back to the first co-ordinate point. 
No site boundary co-ordinates are accepted if they are not real numbers 
between 0 and 10. Each entry is validated, and the user asked to repeat the co-
ordinate entry for that point, if either co-ordinate value is invalid. 
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Once all of the site co-ordinates are entered, the site is printed on the screen 
without the grid, so that the user can get a better perspective of the shape. The 
user is then given the opportunity to change any site boundary co-ordinates. 
The co-ordinates are printed in tabular form on the screen in text mode. If the 
user wishes to make a change~ the incorrect boundary point is identified and the 
user is then able to enter correct co-ordinates. This process is repeated until the 
user indicates that no change is necessary. 
Next, the user is asked to enter the bearing and a metric dimension for a 
horizontal grid unit. This allows a scale to be calculated. The bearing is printed 
in the final output file. An arrow is drawn with a graphic "N" to show the 
direction of North. In this version this adaptation is purely for cosmetic 
reasons. The site area is then approximated by calculating the size of the square 
defined by the extreme site co-ordinates at the left, right, top and bottom of the 
screen. 
The next routine called is INPUTPEOPLE. Its first request from the user is to 
enter the number of personnel on site. The user is then asked the number of 
those personnel that can be discretely placed on site. The remaining personnel 
are assumed to be placed uniformly on site, with a uniform personnel density 
calculated by dividing the number of uniformly distributed people by the 
approximate site area calculated earlier. In a continuous plant, site locations 
will be occupied 24 hours per day and seven days per week or 168 hours per 
week. Process day workers and administrative staff will only be in their 
workplaces for approximately 40 hours per week. Clearly, in the case of 
continuous plant, a catastrophic event has approximately a quarter of the 
likelihood of affecting the day workers. To take this into account for the 
analysis, when the personnel are entered, the user is asked if the job is to~be 
36 
filled 24 hours per day. If not, the number of people affected in that bunch is 
divided by four. The uniform distribution is likewise altered in the calculation 
of uniform personnel density. The community risk for day working is a quarter 
of that for continuous 24 hour shift working, although the risk for an individual 
worker is the same for an equal contact time. 
The placement of discrete personnel on site is done on the 10x10 grid, with 
numbers generated from the NUMPRINT subroutine used to indicate clumps of 
people. The printing of these clumps of people is done through the routine 
DRA WPERS, and is intended to convey useful information on to the screen. 
Whether the clumps of people are on the site for 24 hours or not is not shown on 
the screen. The information is kept in a parallel array for reference in later 
calculations. 
In ENTERCOMP, the locations of potentially hazardous compartments are 
placed on the site. Once again, the placement is done through the 10x10 grid. 
As co-ordinates are entered, a 3 pixel by 3 pixel black square is plotted at the co-
ordinates, with an identifying number underneath. The number is generated 
through NUMPRINT and a hash mark is printed alongside. As with 
ENTERSITE, compartment co-ordinates are validated, so that the only co-
ordinates accepted are real numbers between 0 and 10. Once the compartment 
co-ordinates are entered, the user is asked the name and hazardous effect radius 
for each. The effect radii will be derived from the WHAZAN II consequence 
analysis. 
ENTFREQ is the next routine. In this routine, the user is asked to choose the 
failure frequency and probability of mitigation failure for each compartment. 
The choices will be made from descriptor tables that are printed on the screen. 
These tables are similar to the descriptor tables mentioned in the Keey 
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methodology, except that they have identification codes printed alongside 
frequencies and probabilities to help the user make their selection. Values for 
these choices are stored in arrays aligned to the compartment number. 
The last main routine in the software is FINAL. FINAL prepares and presents 
the output data. It first calls a subroutine called EVALUATE to calculate the 
numbers of people affected by each hazardous compartment.. For each 
compartment, the area within the effect radii is multiplied by the uniform 
personnel density. Each discrete clump of personnel is then tested to see if it 
comes within the effect radii using the theorem of pythagorus (calculating the 
hypotenuse of a triangle, knowing the relative difference of the x and y co-
ordinates between the compartment and the personnel site in question). The 
sum of these values give a total for people affected by that compartment. It is 
recognised that incorrect assumptions are taken when uniform numbers of 
people are calculated to be seriously affected by a compartment when its effect 
radii goes beyond the site boundary. Clearly, a hazard that can manifest itself 
outside the boundary should not be ignored, but multiplying the area it 
influences by the on site personnel density is inappropriate. It has been retained 
in its current form and regarded as inaccurate. No solution has yet been 
decided upon as any more manipulation of these data could well involve more 
incorrect assumptions. 
The FINAL routine then calls the subroutine CALCINDICES, where the output 
data file is opened. The software prints the site data to both the output file and 
screen. These data are; the site name and personnel data and for each 
compartment, its name and identification number, failure frequency, mitigation 
probability, number of persons affected, the compartment hazard index 
calculated and the total site index, summed from the individual compartment 
hazard indices. The Apple Macintosh clipboard is then opened for a graphic 
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insertion. The software prints to the screen and clipboard a graphic image of 
the site boundary, compartment locations with effect radii, a scale in a gradation 
of ten and twenty metres, an arrow showing the direction of north and the 
situation of discrete personnel numbers. 
The site output file can be opened through any word processing package. Once 
it is opened, the site graphic can be pasted on to the bottom of the text and the 
file can be saved as a whole. 
The interrelationship of these routines are more clearly shown in the subroutine 
diagram in Appendix 6. 
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Figure 5.3.1a Flow chart of Encoded Method 
Bracket bars at the side of the chart refer to the relevant subroutine. 
initialise variables 
and dimension 
arrays 
print title screen 
and enter site 
name 
enter site boundary 
coordinates 
enter ancillary info-
i.e. bearing of plant 
and dimension of 
site 
calculate approx 
site area 
place discrete 
personnel on site 
calculate uniform 
personnel density 
START 
y 
ENTERSITE 
INPUTPEOPLE 
40 
Figure 5.3.1b Flow chart of Encoded Method 
I 
enter compartment 
coordinates on site 
I 
enter info for 
each compartment . 
I 
for each 
compartment 
choose fail freq 
and probability 
unsuccessful 
mitigation 
I 
evaluate persons 
affected 
by each hazardous 
compartment 
I 
calculate hazard 
indices and display 
on screen and 
transfer to output 
file 
I 
print final site 
diagram,effect 
radii 
dimension, 
bearing and 
personnel sitings 
to screen and clip 
board 
l 
end 
ENTERCOMP 
/manual input, "" 
..,..-::~m-----"""' information 
'-from WHAZAN II 
ENTFREQ 
EVALUATE 
CALC INDICES 
SITEPRINT 
PRTRADII 
DIMENSION 
ARROW 
DRAWPERS 
FINAL 
41 
5.4 Whazan II 
The software chosen for the consequence analysis was Whazan IT (DNV 
Technica 1992). Whazan IT is a MS. DOS compatible consequence analysis 
software package with a chemicals database that estimates the consequences of 
a variety of process hazards. The software encompasses 17 consequence models 
and the physical properties of 20 hazardous substances. The hazardous 
substance database is expandable and modifiable. 
The user first chooses a model and a hazardous substance, then inputs relevant 
site data. The type of site specific data generally requested is the ambient 
temperature, meteorological conditions and the nature of the pressure and 
temperature of the hazardous substance. The model then calculates the 
consequence and offers both hard and soft copy results. These results are 
usually in both graphical and tabular form. The user can choose another model 
for analysis at this point or vary the results of the previous analysis by inputting 
different conditions or another hazardous substance. 
In an earlier version of the software, linked consequence models existed. A 
linked consequence model will run several consequence models sequentially, 
using the results of one model as input data for another. For example, an orifice 
flow model could give flow data that could be used in a jet fire or toxic gas 
release model. In Whazan IT, the user has to develop such linkages from 
individual consequence models. 
42 
5.5 Cases not covered by Whazan II 
It is important to note that the Whazan II software does not produce 
consequence data for all situations. One specialised type of hazardous event is 
a dust explosion. While dust and gas explosions share criteria like lower and 
upper explosive limits, empirical prediction of dust explosions is based on Kst 
values, volume of explosion containment and dust fineness (Schofield 1985). As 
dust explosion mechanisms are well known, consequence data for explosions 
can be estimated accurately. Coverage of dust explosions is especially 
important in a country like New Zealand. The country has several of its major 
industries involved in processing or producing fine organic or metallic powders 
and dusts, e.g. milk powder or flour production. 
The dust explosion scenario starts with a primary explosion. This occurs when 
an ignition source ignites a cloud of dust (usually smaller than 250j..ll.n) in the 
presence of oxygen. If the explosion is within the confines of a vessel the over 
pressure can exceed eight bar (800kPa). As few vessels are able to withstand 
this amount of pressure, the containing vessel will normally rupture. Devices 
such as explosion venting or suppression will significantly mitigate these 
effects, but are not always utilised. In this type of explosion, people will be 
seriously affected within a radius of 20-30m. Of those affected, impact will be 
usually severe. 
If the explosion takes place in a room, or the flame front escapes the vessel into 
the wider environment, a secondary type explosion can take place. In sites 
where there is processing or production of combustible dusts, excess dust can 
accumulate throughout the building. A secondary explosion occurs when the 
primary explosion blast or shock wave excites this accumulated dust. Upon 
ignition this cloud explodes, usually transmitting the flame and pressure wave 
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throughout the building. These explosions are much more hazardous as they 
occur in the workers environment and their effects are almost impossible to 
mitigate. The area of where people will be seriously affected will be the entire 
containing building and probably another five or ten metres around its border 
to deal with the explosion's effects on the building, e.g. missiles, broken glass. 
5.6 Use of consequence data 
When considering the consequences of the hazards within the site 
compartments, it was important to estimate the magnitude of the effect the 
hazards would have on their surroundings. Many hazardous situations, such as 
electrocution, mechanical impact or corrosive chemicals have only localised 
effects. Their effect distances are usually less than Sm. The three main types of 
hazardous situation that have long range effects are fires, toxic releases and 
explosions. These effect distances are functions of the quantities of hazardous 
substances involved, their physical and chemical properties and site data such 
as wind speed and ambient temperat,ure. Whazan II (DNV Technica 1992) was 
used to give estimates of these long range effects. 
Whazan II is a consequence package. Inputs into the consequence models are 
data such as quantities of hazardous substances, and site conditions. The 
models use these data along with the physical and chemical data from its built 
in chemical data base to estimate the magnitudes of the physical manifestations 
of those hazards. The remaining task is to link these consequences to the 
impacts they will have on the persons within the site. 
Considering the three types of long range hazards, it is important to set dose 
criteria for being seriously affected. Whazan II gives consequence information 
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by relating changes in the magnitude of a particular hazard's physical 
manifestation with respect to distance. By defining the seriously affected dose 
criteria for each hazard, it is possible to estimate the radius from that hazard 
where serious effects will occur. 
In the case of fires, the primary physical manifestation of the hazard is thermal 
radiation. A dose of 4.7 kW /m2 was chosen for this criteria (see Appendix 1). 
This dose corresponds to secon&-degree burns occurring within 30 seconds. 
This was seen as the tier of effect where the effect was serious. The effects for 
the tier below (2.1 kW /m2) were akin to bad sunburn (which is probably one of 
the most voluntarily exposed hazards these days). 
The effects of a fire may be twofold. There will be thermal radiation (using the 
dose criteria mentioned previously) and there will be a blast over-pressure, i.e. 
the case of fires that result in detonations as a result of partial confinement. A 
blast over pressure of two psi (14 kPa) was chosen. From consequence tables 
(see Appendix 1), this pressure will cause a building to be to be badly cracked 
and uninhabitable. This criteria was selected because it fell between criteria 
giving a low chance of injury and a moderate chance of fatality. The severity of 
impact was seen as commensurate with that of thermal radiation. As well as 
people being caught in the blast, it was considered that the blast over-pressure 
would also contribute to people being affected psychologically, by injuries from 
building failures and from airborne missiles. 
In the case of the toxic effects of hazardous substances, suitable criteria are 
already set. The Department of Labour regularly publish a book called 
"Workplace Exposure Standards and Biological Exposure Indices for New 
Zealand" (Department of Labour 1992). Based of the threshold limit values set 
overseas, this book sets the workplace exposure standards (WES) for a wide 
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variety of hazardous substances. The WES is a recommended maximum 
exposure with a particular substance. Three type of levels are offered within the 
book. A time-weighted average (TWA) gives the maximum level of exposure 
that a person can tolerate in an eight hour day without effect. The short-term 
exposure limit (STEL) gives a maximum level that a person can be exposed to 
for a short time without serious effect. This exposure is allowed for four 
intervals of 15 minutes per day. The WE5-Ceiling gives the level of exposure to 
any person that cannot be exceeded, even for an instant. 
The STEL gives the most appropriate level for the exposure during an 
emergency as the TWA level would be reasonably commonplace on site. Where 
in the booklet, a STEL level is not available, a Ceiling or TWA level will still give 
a benchmark. 
46 
6.0 PROJECT OUTPUTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Test Case 
To display how the software performs, the following site (see Figure 6.1.1) was 
designed as a test case. The site is a sulphuric acid plant. 
Figure 6.1.1 Test Site 
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On the site there are four main regions of high potential hazard. These will be 
the four hazardous compartments used in the analysis. 
1- The sulphur melter. Sulphur is melted by steam from the boiler house. Due 
to variable product sources, hydrogen sulphide is sometimes liberated when the 
sulphur is being melted. There is exhaust ventilation, but condensing sulphur 
vapour can block the exhaust duct. Tests have shown that when this happens, 
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approximately one kilogram of hydrogen sulphide is released before an alarm 
sounds and other ventilation can be applied. Hydrogen sulphide has aWES 
(STEL) of 15ppm (Department of Labour 1992). 
From the Whazan II consequence analysis of this situation (ref Appendix 11), 
the radius of fatality probability is approximately 50m. This distance was 
decided after using the Dense Cloud Dispersion model (H2S has a relative 
density to air of 1.1895 (Perry and Chilton, 1983)). The consequence analysis 
gave a fatality probability of zero at distances above 20m, but the ground level 
concentration remained at 0.05-0.1% (500-1000ppm) until over 50m. This 
distance was arbitrarily chosen because of the difficulty in interpreting the 
graph after 50m. 
The simultaneous failure of the extraction system and melting of hydrogen 
sulphide tainted sulphur occurs about once in ten years, and the likelihood of 
effectively mitigating the effects of the failure can only be termed as 'fair'. Due 
to the small quantities of hydrogen sulphide evolved, the explosive hazard is 
considered negligible. 
2 - The sulphur burner. Sulphur dioxide is produced from the oxidation of 
sulphur in the sulphur burner. Corrosive action of the sulphur dioxide has been 
known to cause the flange at the exit of the vessel to fail. This releases 
approximately 1 kilogram per second into the atmosphere. It takes two minutes 
for the alarms to detect the sulphur dioxide and for shift workers to fit a strap to 
block the leak. Sulphur dioxide has aWES (STEL) of 5pprn (Department of 
Labour 1992). 
From the Whazan II consequence analysis of this situation (ref Appendix 11), 
the radius of fatality probability is approximately BOrn. This distance wa~ 
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decided after using the Dense Cloud Dispersion model (502 has a relative 
density to air of 1.434 (Perry and Chilton, 1983)). The consequence analysis did 
not give a fatality probability of zero untilSOm distance was exceeded, but the 
ground level concentration ramps down to approximately 0.1% (1000ppm) until 
approximately 80m, where ground level concentration diminished to a level 
near zero (due to the resolution of the output graphs, fine interpretation is 
difficult). 
From national statistics, the frequency of flange failure is estimated to be 
approximately 0.001 per year (or one failure per 1000 years) and the likelihood 
of effectively mitigating the effects of the failure can be termed as 'fair'. 
3- The LPG bullet on site has a capacity of 10 tonne. From the Whazan II 
analysis of this situation (ref Appendix 11), the radius of serious effect is 
approximately 180m. This distance is derived from matching the vulnerability 
criteria set in chapter 5.5 to the data gained from running both the 
Fireball/Bleve and the Vapour Cloud Explosion consequence models for 
propane and choosing the worst case. In the bleve calculation one sixth of the 
bullet's capacity is used in the calculation because a bleve only occurs when the 
vessel is half full and usually involves about a third of the remaining liquid 
(Keey, 1991b). Data from both models gave approximately equal distances. 
From national statistics, the frequency of failure is estimated to be 0.0001 per 
year (or once in every ten thousand years) and the likelihood of effectively 
mitigating the effects of the failure can be termed as 'good'. 
4- The sulphuric acid storage tanks have a 70 tonne capacity and are situated in 
a wide bund that surrounds the tanks at a 20m radius. 
49 
The operators responsible for pumping out acid to tank wagons and circulating 
acid between the tanks, regularly allow the tanks to overflow and spil~ into the 
bund. From a qualitative analysis of this situation, the radius of serious effect is 
estimated at the bunded radius of 20m. The radius of effect should be no larger 
because the acid is concentrated and the bund has internal pumps for acid 
removal. People will be serio:usly affected within the bund because when the 
tanks leak, they leak very quickly and any contact with the acid will be serious. 
The bund area is also used as a thoroughfare from one side of the plant to the 
other. From recent site history, a pumping failure is estimated to occur about 
once a year. The likelihood of effectively mitigating the effects of the failure can 
be termed as 'good'. 
The hazards from the catalytic reactor and sulphur store were not considered in 
this analysis. Plant management are currently negotiating contracts to 
significantly modify safety equipment in both units, so an analysis of them now 
would be misleading. 
Personnel- There are 25 people on site, with 14 working in administration 
during the day, two shift workers on the control room and two day workers 
who pump out acid to tank wagons. There are two more day workers and five 
shift workers that work in all places around the site. 
6.2 Analysis of results 
The results from the analysis of the test site in example 1 give a site index of 
18.44 (see Appendix 5 for complete output data from software and Figure 6.2.1 
for summary of indices). 
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Figure 6.2.1 example 1 summary 
sulphur melter index= 5.05 
sulphur burner index = 0.13 
LPG bullet index = 0.031 
acid storage index = 13.23 
site index= 18A4 
The site index of 18.44 means that approximately 18 person on this site would 
be seriously affected by the four hazards specified over the 100 year reference 
period. The individual contributions of these effects show that over 99% of the 
people will be affected by the hydrogen sulphide emissions from the sulphur 
melter or the corrosive actions of concentrated sulphuric acid leaking from the 
bulk storage tanks. A further 0.7% will be affected by sulphur dioxide 
emissions and 0.2% affected by a leak from the LPG bullet. 
The basis for the range in the effects of these hazards can be best seen in the 
relative analysis of the 'risk' terms, or the likelihood that a failure will become a 
hazardous situation. This value is the product of frequency of failure and the 
chance of an ineffective response. The values are as follows; sulphur melter 5, 
sulphur burner 0.05, LPG bullet 0.002 and acid storage 20. The two groups of 
results are over two orders of magnitude apart. This shows one of the most 
useful elements in a rapid ranking procedure, that high consequence, low 
frequency situations do not totally dominate the results in a hazard appraisal of 
a site. Due to lay perception of the risks involved and the emotive issues 
regarding multiple casualty events, the risks from bleves and vapour cloud 
explosions do tend to be overstated. The greatest error in this analysis would be 
in the estimation of the numbers of persons affected by the LPG bullet, because 
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the area within its radius of effect is 75% off the site. This would indicate that 
the 0.2% contribution of site hazardousness from the LPG bullet is elevated. 
This example shows that the likelihood of a hazardous situation plays the major 
role in the final index value, as it does in the ranking of hazards. According to 
this analysis, failures at the aci.d storage tanks are the most hazardous events on 
site. Within the broad umbrella term of 'seriously affected', corrosive burns 
from an acid spill will be counted on equal terms to third degree burns and 
fatalities from a vapour cloud explosion or toxic leak. This is not to say 
regularly occurring accidents involving corrosive burns should be ignored. This 
analysis may highlight the problem and give plant management the instigation 
to rectify the problem. It may be that corrosive burns are actually causing other 
significant problems with lost time, accident compensation levies and damage 
to plant. The acid load out bay represents the main sales area for the plant's 
primary product. If the equipment around the acid storage area is damaged, 
the plant may have to run on reduced capacity while equipment is being 
repaired or replaced. If staff are injured, replacement staff may have to be 
trained. 
In this test site, plant management may wish to rectify the problem with the 
acid storage area by fitting a programmable logic controller (PLC) to facilitate 
the pump out routines. The frequency of PLC failure is one per 100 years. The 
results of the analysis of this new system are shown in example 2 (see Figure 
6.2.1 for a summary and Appendix 5 for a full output). Here the acid storage 
index has been reduced to the magnitude of the sulphur burner and LPG 
cylinder. If these levels were used as an acceptability criteria, the sulphur 
melter compartment could then also be modified. 
Figure 6.2.2 example 2 summary 
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sulphur melter index = 5.05 
sulphur burner index = 0.13 
LPG bullet index= 0.031 
acid storage index = 0.13 
site index = 5.34 
In example 3 (see Figure 6.2.3 for a summary and Appendix 5 for a full output), 
the management have decided to increase the ventilation duct on the exhaust of 
the sulphur melter. Tests have shown that the increased duct size will reduce 
the frequency of duct blockage by an order of magnitude. They have also 
decided to reduce the LPG bullet capacity to 5 tonne in an effort to improve 
plant safety. 
Figure 6.2.3 example 3 summary 
sulphur melter index = 0.51 
sulphur burner index = 0.13 
LPG bullet index = 0:023 
acid storage index = 13.23 
site index = 13.89 
The reduction in the LPG bullet capacity reduced the effect radius down to 
150m (for the Whazan IT analysis, see Appendix 11). This reduced the LPG 
bullet hazard index from 0.0311 to 0.0231. As this is not a significant reduction 
in hazardousness, the management may wish to retain the 10 tonne bullet, 
which will reduce the need for refilling and avoid the costs of swapping the 
LPG bullets. However, the change to the exhaust duct radius has reduced the 
melter hazard index to 0.5 persons seriously affected per 100 years. This is a 
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significant improvement, especially considering that the alteration in the 
exhaust duct diameter can be achieved for low cost and minimal disruption to 
normal operating conditions. This example shows how a rapid ranking 
appraisal can quickly highlight the effects of plant modifications. 
In example 4 (see Figure 6.2.4 for a summary and Appendix 5 for a full output), 
the management have decided to move the company's typing pool to the 
control room for two months, while part of the administration block is being 
redecorated. To pay for redecoration, management has decided to remove one 
flame detector from the LPG bullet. This will reduce the eme:rgency response 
effectiveness to only "fair". 
Figure 6.2.4 example 4 summary 
sulphur melter index = 13.80 
sulphur burner index = 0.22 
LPG bullet index = 0.087 
acid storage index = 13.23 
site index = 27.34 
The movement of staff further into the plant has increased the overall site index. 
These people will now be affected by the hazards from the sulphur melter, 
sulphur burner and the LPG bullet. The LPG bullet also has a reduced 
probability of effective emergency response. However, the LPG bullet index 
only increases to 0.0867. This example shows the sensitivity the method has for 
personnel location. In methods calculating hazard indices for other defined 
target groups, the sensitivity to their location would be similar because of the 
ability in the methodology to actively locate these target groups on a hazardous 
site. 
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It would be inappropriate to analyse the data in any more detail than above. 
The rapid ranking software is intended to rank the hazards in order for some 
kind of priority action and to indicate those areas on site where further 
investigation may be warranted. It can also be used to gauge the movement in 
hazardousness that accompanies modification or change in the installation. The 
analysis is simple and if a· more sophisticated analysis is required, several of the 
techniques mentioned in chapter 2 could be used 
6.3 Overlap discussion 
In these analyses, it will be common for two effect radii to overlap. It is 
important to understand what this overlap means and what the overlap area 
hazardousness value will be. In the current software, the case for overlap is not 
considered. 
For example, consider the situation in Figure 6.3.1, where there are two 
hazardous compartments on a site. For convenience, these shall be titled 
compartments #A and #B. 
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Figure 6.3.1 Overlap of Serious Effect Areas 
In this case, their effect radii overlap, therefore the area in the overlap between 
#A and #B will potentially be affected by both hazardous compartments. 
The individual compartment index is calculated by; 
HI =frequency of failure (f) x probability of ineffective response (p) 
x numbers of people seriously affected (N) 
=f.p.N 
As the hazardous compartments are considered independent, the effects can be 
added. It will be possible to add these effects because the individual hazard 
index represents that particular hazard's expected potential impact on that site. 
The overlap area will experience the effects from both hazardous compartments. 
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Therefore the overlap index will be illa plus illb (= illa AND illb plus illa OR 
ill b) 
As the number of people in the overlap will be static, only risk part of index 
(Risk= f.p) can be added. 
Riska OR Riskb = Riska + Riskb - Riska .Riskb 
= fa·Pa +~·Ph- fa·Pa·~·Pb 
Riska AND Riskb = Riska.Riskb 
= fa·Pa·~·Pb 
Riska plus Riskb = fa·Pa +~·Ph- fa·Pa·~·Pb + fa·Pa·~·Pb 
= fa·Pa +~·Ph 
illaplusillb = (fa·Pa + ~·Pb). Nnb 
N1n2 = N1n2 (discrete)+ N1n2 (uniform) 
N1n2 (discrete) can be seen from the screen, so input can be manual. 
N 1 n 2 (uniform) = Area 1 n 2. personnel density 
Therefore, to calculate the overlap index, the area of overlap must be calculated. 
The method used to calculate the overlap area is derived in Appendix 7 and 
theta, the software designed to calculate the overlap area is explained in 
Appendix 8, with a software listing in Appendix 9. 
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To better understand the effect of overlap, consider the case of overlap between 
two compartments, 1 and 2 in Figure 6.3.2. 
Figure 6.3.2 Case Example of Site Overlap 
Site data input: ra (rl) =lOOm, rb (r2) = 80m, ab =140m; personnel density= 
0.0003 people/m2. There are eight people affected by #1, Five affected by #2 
and three within the overlap area between #1 and #2. 
Assume ft·P1 = 1 and f2·P2 = 2.5. 
The Area of #1 = 31416m2, the Area of #2 = 20106m2. 
From the software Theta (refer to Appendix 9), 0t = 34.1°, 02 = 43.4°, Area1n2 = 
3069m2. 
HI = f.p.N 
Hit = 1 X (5 + 3 + 0.0003 X 31416) = 17.42 
HI2 = 2.5 X (3 + 2 + 0.0003 X 20106) = 27.58 
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lllln2 = (ft·Pl + f2.p2) x (3 + 0.0003 x Areatn2) 
= 3.5 X (3.92) = 13.72 
This analysis shows that the overlap area is actually less hazardous than the 
individual effect circles. H the severity of the hazards impact were measured 
against property or the environment, the analysis may yield different results. 
The results from this analysis will also change with different personnel 
locations. 
The effect radii will describe an area around a hazardous component, where the 
number of people contained can be summed to give an estimate of the numbers 
affected by that hazard. The radii are not used as hazardous distances, although 
they are derived as hazardous distances from models in Whazan IT. However, 
that distance has no meaning in the context of hazard index calculation. 
The effect area will have uniform risk (as defined by the product of frequency of 
failure and the probability of ineffective response), but will not have uniform 
hazardousness. In the example· above, the risk within Area1 was 1, while the 
risk within Area2 was 2.5, giving a risk within the overlap area of 1 + 2.5 = 3.5 
(units unspecified for this example). Hazardousness is not uniform because the 
project methodology allows non-uniform (discrete) placement of personnel and 
calculation of the numbers of uniformly distributed people affected will use the 
overlap area. The overlap area will invariably be small in comparison to the 
main hazard area, and will give correspondingly small numbers of uniformly 
distributed personnel within. In any case, hazardousness cannot be defined for 
an area. The hazardousness will be attributed to the hazardous compartment, 
as it will be to the encompassing site. It is easier to visualise the circular areas 
described by the effect radii as risk templates that can be directly applied to a 
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target group within, in this case personnel. In the case of the hazardous 
compartment's impact on property or the environment, a suitable criteria will be 
decided upon, then respective effect radii will be estimated and interaction 
between the template and that group will indicate that particular variant of 
hazardousness. 
Hazard indices can only be added when the summed value is not attributed to a 
specific geometric area, as in the case of the combined site index. When two or 
more hazard indices is summed to calculate the hazardousness of an overlap, 
the numbers of people affected are being counted more than once. Instead, the 
overlap will contain a target group with the potential to be exposed to more 
than one hazard. In other words, the target will experience the hazardous 
effects from both compartments to some degree. The calculation of overlap 
hazardousness does not deal exclusively with the impact of both hazards 
occurring at the same time. Instead it is an estimation of the impact the area 
within the overlap will experience from two or more hazards within the 100 
year time frame. When estimating the hazardousness of an overlap area, this 
increased potential for hazard exposure is what we wish to ascribe to that area. 
Adding hazard indices for a combined site index is allowable because it is a 
general estimate of the hazardousness that the site will expect to experience 
over 100 years. Specific overlap area contributions are not being counted, nor is 
that site index related to any specific piece of ground. The site index is a non-
specific general value for the overall site hazardousness that can be used to 
indicate the quality of overall plant safety, through comparison with other sites 
or the same site after a period of time. 
The major problem of overlap analysis is that while the software in Appendix 9 
can deal adequately with an overlap of two radii, it cannot deal with overlaps of 
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three or more (i.e. anbnc ). The geometry of this situation is much more 
complex and due to the time estimated to develop a proof for overlaps of three 
of more surfaces, further investigation on the overlap of effect radii was 
discontinued. 
6.4 Comparison with the Dow Fire and Explosion Index 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index system (Dow Chemical Company, 1987) is a 
step by step approach to rate the risks of fire and explosion hazards in process 
installations. The Fire and Explosion Index is a product of risk values covering 
General Process Hazards, Special Process Hazards and a Material Factor. The 
General Process Hazards are derived from those hazards common to that 
particular process. The Special Process Hazards cover hazards arising from the 
physical conditions that the material(s) in the process are held in and the 
process working environment. The Material Factor indicates the propensity of a 
material to be involved in a hazardous situation involving fire or explosion and 
is derived from the NFPA 704 (NFPA, 1990) values ofNf and Nr, representing 
indices for relative flammability and reactivity. The Dow system was chosen to 
validate the hazard ranking software developed in this project because it is a 
internationally accepted method of hazards analysis, it employs a risk ranking 
type of technique and it is simple to apply. 
As mentioned, the Dow index deals primarily with fires and explosions. the 
only compartment in the test case that had a risk of fire or explosion was the 
LPG bullet. Toxicity is covered in the index, but only in the section on Special 
Process Hazards where the contribution of the NFPA toxicity index Nh (NFPA, 
1990) is only one of 14 elements in the section. Toxicity has no contribution in 
the Material Factor, which is a major multiplier within the index. In the test site 
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used in this project, four materials were used. These were hydrogen sulphide 
(liberated from sulphur in the sulphur melter), sulphur dioxide (escaping from 
the exit of the sulphur burner), propane (from the LPG bullet) and sulphuric 
acid (escaping from the acid storage tanks). Propane and hydrogen sulphide 
were given material factors of 21, while sulphur dioxide and sulphuric acid 
were given material factors of 1. Concentrated sulphuric acid is not particularly 
toxic or mobile, but sulphur dioxide has aWES (STEL) of 5ppm (Department of 
Labour 1992), one third the recommended exposure of hydrogen sulphide at 
15ppm (Department of Labour 1992). Hydrogen sulphide is given a higher 
material factor because it is a flammable gas. 
This contributed to the disparity of the fire and explosion indices shown in 
summary in Figure 6.4.1 (see full Dow Analysis sheets in Appendix 14). 
Table 6.4.1 Comparison of Dow Fire and Explosion Indices and Hazard 
Indices 
Process Unit Dow Fire and Explosion Hazard Index 
Index 
sulphur melter 137.7 5.05 
sulphur burner 3.3 0.13 
LPG bullet 112.9 0.031 
acid storage 3.135 13.23 
It is easier to compare the two methods by examining both the positive and 
negative aspects of each method. The Dow method is probably the more 
reliable method. The steps involved in calculating the index are more 
numerous and detailed. While the method is somewhat arbitrary in its 
approach, the structure to the method gives the user well set guidelines in using 
the method and high reproducibility of results. The years of development by 
Dow Chemical Corporation also mean that the method is refined and based on 
considerable experience. The derivation of material factors from NFP A 794 
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reinforces this experienced and trustworthy approach. While the method deals 
exclusively with risks from fires and explosions, it does so thoroughly. 
Consideration is made at all facets of the production environment and a range 
of fires and explosions are covered, including dust explosions. 
Aside from the lack of toxicity impact on the Dow index, the software designed 
in this project would give the most realistic ranking. Rapid ranking methods 
are used on industrial sites as the first step in identifying particularly hazardous 
areas or agglomerations of hazards. This allows resources to be allocated most 
effectively in the control of these hazards, be that control through, new 
hardware, new software or simply more attention. The rapid ranking software 
in this project takes account of the frequencies of failure events, as well as 
available mitigation and the consequences. The embodiment of a time related 
value in the project hazard index brings an element of risk into the analysis, 
which is essential for prioritisation of industrial hazards. The software may 
highlight a low consequence event that happens once per year, instead of 
concentrating on potentially catastrophic events that may occur once in 107 
years. In a plant with an operating life of 25 years, the low consequence event is 
going to do more to disrupt wo"rk, injure people and cause down-time, thus its 
control can become the higher priority (depending on how practical the control 
procedure is). The project software can help set this priority through its ranking 
process. The project software will also reflect changes made to the plant 
hardware and software faster. 
There are two other elements of the Dow index method which have application 
in a comparison with the project method. The loss control credit factors are a 
series of mitigation elements that the method user can indicate are present in 
the site being analysed. Aligned to each element is a number that represents the 
degree to which that element can help mitigate an undesirable incident (these 
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numbers are usually nominally less than one). The loss control credit factors are 
grouped under three headings, namely Process Control, Material Isolation and 
Fire Protection. For the process unit analysed, these factors are multiplied 
together to give a unit credit factor. These factors are similar in intention to the 
index for probability of an effective response used in the project method. When 
comparing the loss control cre9it factors for each process unit analysed with the 
mitigation probability chosen (Refer to Table 6.4.2), there is a certain relativity 
between the data, but this does more to reinforce that the initial choices for 
mitigation probability were correct. 
Table 6.4.2 Comparison of Loss Control Credit Factors From Dow Method 
With Chosen Probabilities of Effective Response 
Process Unit Loss Control Credit Probability Choice 
Sulphur melter 0.866 0.5 
Sulphur burner 0.805 0.5 
LPG bullet 0.73 0.2 
Acid storage 0.95 0.2 
The other element of the Dow method worthy of mention is the Area of 
Exposure. The Area of Exposure (actually given as a radius) is the area 
containing equipment that could be exposed to a fire or a fuel-air explosion 
generated in the process unit being evaluated. The area is calculated from a 
radius of exposure which is 0.84 x the Fire and Explosion Index (in feet). Like 
the areas calculated by the project software, this area is a simplified circle 
around the process unit. In Table 6.4.3 the Dow Areas of Exposure are 
compared with the radii of serious effect generated from the Whazan II data 
and used as input data in the project software. 
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Table 6.4.3 Comparison Between Dow Area (Radius) of Exposure and Radius 
of Serious Effect Derived From Whazan II. 
Process Unit Area of Exp. (ft) Area of Exp. (m) Radius of 
Serious Effect (m) 
Sulphur melter 115.7 35 50 
Sulphur burner 2.772 0.84 80 
LPG bullet 94.8 28.9 180 
Acid storage 2.63 0.72 20 
From the definition of the Area of Exposure, there is obviously a low chance of 
a fire developing around the acid storage tanks, even to a radius of 0.72m. 
Admittedly, Table 6.4.3 is displaying Dow Index data in a form that was not 
intended, by comparing them to analyses that have taken toxicity into account. 
It is still worthwhile displaying the data, for the sake of comparing the indices 
for the LPG bullet. The Whazan II data gives an effect distance 6x that of the 
Dow data. The criteria for consequences in this project, cited in chapter 5.5 are 
set at a reasonably low impact and take no account of site topography. The 
criteria for the Dow Area of Exposure is based on estimations of plant damage. 
Considering the experience in the method and the operating history of the Dow 
Chemical Corporation, one could assume that the distances are of a realistic 
magnitude for that purpose. The Dow Area of Exposure could therefore be 
used within the project method to estimate the impacts on property within the 
site, if that were the impact target group. 
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7.0 CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS 
The suggested modifications to this software come under three categories. 
7.1 Basic Improvements 
The first category for modification are those changes that could be done to fine 
tune the current software. These will include the modifying of current 
subroutines, adding new routine and making the execution of code more 
efficient. These modifications are the minimum required for widespread 
commercial use of the software. 
To tidy up the software, the opportunities to have entry data corrected should 
be spread through the entire package. At the moment, only the site boundary 
data can be corrected. However, it could be argued that because of the 
simplicity of the software, an incorrect entry would only mean re-running the 
software, with nothing but a few minutes time lost. Validation routines for data 
could also be put in throughout the software. Only site and compartment 
entries are validated at the moment: If incorrect entries are put in for personnel 
positions, or personnel numbers an incorrect analysis will result. In the cases 
stated, either personnel will be placed off the screen or the incorrect numbers of 
personnel will cause an erroneous result. Validation is not used throughout the 
current version of the code because it is time consuming during software 
execution. 
The opportunity to be able to retrieve data from files and review it would also 
be useful. File retrieval software would not be difficult to write and there is also 
the opportunity to review the output files from more than one site at a time. In 
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the current form of the software, its simplicity would probably preclude any 
meaningful comparison, but it may be worth considering for further versions. 
One obvious route for modification is to calculate a hazard index that would 
have contributions for the impacts on the plant and equipment on site and on 
the environment, as per the original Tweeddale and Keey methodologies. 
Considering that this software is being produced for the small New Zealand 
industry, it is reasonable to assume that identifying ways to minimise plant 
damage and full compliance with the relevant sections of the Resource 
Management Act, 1991 (Parliamentary Counsel Office 1991) are going to be of 
considerable importance to the management of these sites. 
In the current software version, the severity index is the only component of the 
hazard index that uses a more complex analysis (using consequence analysis 
from Whazan II with direct positioning of personnel on site to estimate 
personnel impacts). It would also be possible to aid the user in the selection of 
the indices for the frequency of failure and the probability of ineffective 
response. One type of technique could be considered to aid the selection of both 
these values because they both ·represent the likelihood of an undesirable event 
occurring. 
The technique used most often in the analysis of likelihoods is fault tree 
analysis, thus it could be used to help the analysis of the frequency of failure 
and mitigation probability index components. In the case of the frequency of 
failure, the user could define the main compartment failure as the top event on 
the fault tree. The contributing events to that failure could then be broken 
down to individual failures. The values assigned to these individual failures 
could be derived from the descriptor tables. This type of analysis would adjust 
the failure frequency values slightly, and could also increase the understanding 
67 
of the effects of the contributing failure modes. Accident records could also be 
used, along with hazard warning analysis to further improve these final 
frequency values. 
In the case of estimation of mitigation probabilities, the table would be set up 
with the mitigation devices available. The probability of total mitigation failure 
would be derived from the individual probabilities in the descriptor tables. The 
use of fault trees is especially suited to the calculation of mitigation failure 
probabilities because of the need to calculate for the effects of multiple 
mitigation devices. 
One case would be the estimation of the failure frequencies and mitigation 
probabilities concerning the possibility of a propane cylinder exploding into a 
fireball (bleve). A simple estimate of the contributing likelihoods is shown on 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2. 
Figure 7.1 Frequency Of Failure For Bleve 
frequency of failure 
0.12/100 yr 
0.1/1 oo yr 
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0.2 
failure to mitigate 
BLEVE 
0.2 0.2 
Figure 7.2. Probability Of Ineffective Response In Case Of Bleve 
A routine to use this analysis would be reasonably simple to add to the project 
software. The analysis could be kept to limited complexity by setting the 
number of tree levels to two and the number of branches to three. 
These changes are aimed to help the user in the selection of index components. 
They improve the user's understanding of the hazards, without adding to the 
complexity of the use of the software. Thus they do not lead to an over analysis 
and retain the simplicity of method in of this project. Flow diagrams to show 
approximate procedures for these routines are shown in Appendix 10. 
The diagrams used in this section are done using software produced by Arthur. 
D Little Ltd. Faultrease is primarily a graphic display tool for fault tree analysis. 
The software used for this project was Apple Macintosh compatible. Faultrease 
allows the user to build up a fault tree, setting likelihood values at contributing 
'leaves'. The format is user friendly with the reorganisation of branches of the 
tree known as pruning and grafting. The top event likelihood can be calculated 
at any time, using the Boolean operators. 
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7.2 New Programming Software 
The next category involves the transfer of the methodology into a more 
sophisticated software environment. The focus will be based around 
modifications that could be achieved with new programming software that 
were difficult or impossible to achieve using Microsoft Quickbasic. 
The choice of new programming software is varied. A purpose designed 
relational database could be used. It could be considered that because of the 
simple mathematical operations used in the methodology, a data base is more 
important to hold site data. Using a relational database would mean that an on-
line failure frequency database could be built in to the software, with failure 
data being entered automatically as soon as corresponding plant equipment 
were specified. The biggest failing for a relational database would be the lack of 
graphics capability. If graphics capability were deemed important, other more 
sophisticated types of software could be used. Example of these are Pascal or C. 
These languages are both as portable as Microsoft Quick basic, but are more 
sophisticated in their approach and have a more useful graphics capability. 
There are also commercial library routines available that would link such 
software to relational data bases. Unfortunately, this makes the finished 
software quite expensive and somewhat cumbersome. 
The amalgamation of an on line consequence package would also be useful. 
This would avoid the current situation where the consequence package has to 
be run on a different type of computer, using different software. A totally new 
consequence package would not be necessary as it was never the aim of the 
project to re-invent the wheel. The best solution would be to design software to 
interface with the likes of the Whazan II software. 
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7.3 A New Methodology 
The third category is to approach the same initial aims of the project (Software 
that is developed for the New Zealand industry scale, easy to use and 
inexpensive.), with a different methodology. These suggestions will be made 
with the benefit of the time spent on this project. 
The sophistication of the software could be improved significantly by adopting 
a shell type of approach. The first shell would be the analysis in the current 
methodology. This would indicate the high hazard compartments on a specific 
site. The next layer in the shell would be to consider that compartment in the 
same fashion that the software considered the whole site in the first shell. This 
would be to seek out the contributing factors that caused that hazard rating. 
This shell approach could continue toward a breakdown of pipes, valves and 
flanges. An approach of this type of approach would also amalgamate many of 
the broader modifications suggested in this chapter. 
Another way to extend the methodology to adopt a shell analysis, would be to 
extend the approach of Lapp (1990). The method would be to continue the fault 
tree analysis downward through the contributing branches, in an effort to refine 
the result for the top event value. One or all of the compartment indices could 
be further analysed this way. With respect to encoding of the method, further 
application would be simple, once the routines for the Boolean operations were 
written. The scope for this analysis would also be down to the pipe and valve 
level. 
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The final suggestion for change would be the implementation of an expert 
system. Using a very sophisticated (fourth or fifth generation) language, the 
emphasis of the software could be radically changed. Obviously in this case, the 
expense could not be kept so low, but an expert system has the advantage of 
enhancing user friendliness. 
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8.0 HUMAN FACTORS AND RISK MODIFICATION 
8.1 Limitations of Analysis 
While the benefits of the quantitative analysis of hazards have been discussed in 
this document, Tweeddale (1992) warns of too much faith in the infallibility of 
quantitative results. Serious misjudgement can occur when management 
consider a complex quantified analysis of a system to hold all the answers, 
without considering those elements that cannot be quantified. Thus the 
pendulum can either swing back to qualitative analysis, or the consideration of 
new analytical techniques not previously thought to be under the umbrella of 
quantified analysis. Tweeddale states that a hazard evaluation depends more 
on the estimation of management effectiveness than on hardware failures that 
can be estimated using quantitative methods. However, the distinction is not 
sharp, generic failure rates in the literature implicitly embody management 
factors. 
In the conclusion of the reports prepared by the CONCA WE study group (Hope 
1984b), limits were defined on the use of numerical hazard data. The data were 
thought to have limitations in three main areas. First, the actual performance of 
a new plant may differ from that at the design stage, indeed the performance 
will be changed through any modification. Thus any data must be reviewed to 
take account of these changes. The next point was that the analysis is only as 
good as those features that are analysed. The report warned that care should be 
taken in disregarding failure events because low likelihood or because of a lack 
of understanding of the mode(s) of failure. Finally, the report states that the 
human response to unexpected events is difficult to predict, although 
techniques such as task analysis can yield estimates which are consistent with 
operator error rates that have been observed. 
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8.2 Human Error and Plant 'Software' 
It is widely accepted that a large number of major accidents result from 
unpredictable human errors. There are many different types of human error 
defined (Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, 1991), but 
they are usually either caused by the operator acting incorrectly or not at all. It 
is more difficult to assess the reliability of an operator to get valid reliability 
data. Human operators are all unique and fill a far wider spectrum of reliability 
than valves or pipe flanges. However, in most practical instances, human 
reliability will fall within a range depending on the speed of response, quality of 
operator training, situational stress and ergonomic factors. These factors are 
known within error bounds. 
In the defined methodology and software, human factors are not explicitly 
taken into account. In recent years, studies (HMSO 1991) have been conducted 
to estimate the effects of human error on risk values. Indeed, data from these 
studies have been amalgamated into' the process of quantitative assessment. 
These studies attempt to identify all points within a system where incorrect 
human action may lead to adverse consequences. 
8.3 Use of Risk Modifiers 
There have been suggestions to use some semi-quantitative descriptors to 
calculate risk modifiers, taking account of the 'software' within the plant. This 
'software' will include the quality of management, operational staff and how the 
plant hardware interacts with the operators. Tweeddale (1992) presents mixed 
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views on this. On one hand he argues that the use of generic multipliers is 
inappropriate because accidents do not result from the average performance of 
a worker. Instead, they result from particular instances, usually involving 
abnormalities. Tweeddale concludes with a case for generic multipliers, noting 
that while the multiplier may only be an arbitrary midpoint, the magnitude of 
any fine tuning would be even more arbitrary. Instead, a qualifying statement 
could be supplied with the analysis, stating that the values calculated could be 
expected to be either better or worse that the stated value. 
In the calculation of the hazard indices for this project, these generic multipliers 
could have a significant use. The mode of index calculation is reasonably 
simple, with hazard relativity being the main aim. Thus the use of multipliers 
would convey to the analyst user to give more of a 'feel' for the hazards within 
the plant. Simplicity of the index calculation methodology also means that the 
use of the multiplier will not over quantify the indices. Clearly, the 
quantification of hazards cannot replace the pursuit of widespread 
understanding of the hazards on site and the means to control them. 
In his summary of rapid ranking techniques, Bennet (1992) discusses an 
example of a method of introducing a management factor to hazard scores 
calculated. The management factor is in the form of a multiplier to the 
calculated hazard index. This method rates the quality of specified elements of 
that site's safety management system. 
In Bennet's example the quality of four elements in a safety management system 
are rated. These elements will all have a bearing on how effectively the human 
worker will be able to relate to the requirements of its job. The elements are; 
Training procedures, Maintenance of plant and instruments, Instrument and 
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control systems, and Safety management. These elements are then graded 
against descriptors for their performance within the site. 
The use of descriptors mirrors the simplicity of the methodology and software 
produced in this project, thus it could be considered an appropriate addition. In 
the appendix (see Appendix 12) is a short subroutine that can be used to 
calculate these management factors. It could be added on to the main code if 
required. The descriptors are shown in Table 8.3.1. 
Table 8.3.1 Descriptors For Management Qualities 
DESCRIPTOR NUMERICAL RATING 
Poor 0 
Fair .2 
Average .5 
Good .8 
Excellent 1.0 
The equation for calculation of management factors is shown in equation 8.3.2 
8.3.2 1 managementfactor = -m--------L (weighting * ratingi) 
j=l 
Where m is the number of safety management elements, in this case four. In his 
method, Bennet used weightings of 0.5. This means that if all of the descriptors 
are given as average the management factor is calculated as 1.0. With the 
weightings and numerical ratings for this model, management factors have a 
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useable range between 0.5 and 10 (the management factor is infinite for 
consistent ratings of poor), as shown in Figure 8.3.3. 
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The management factor can be used on the site index as a summary of plant 
management, or as a multiplier to the individual compartment indices, where 
qualities of hardware and softv~are vary throughout the plant. 
To show the application of management factor multipliers, consider a case 
example used in the analysis for this project. In the first example of the test site 
(see Appendix 5), the index calculated for the acid storage area was 13.23. If the 
training on the site was 'poor', if the maintenance at the acid storage area was 
'fair', the instrumentation 'average' and the overall safety management 'average', 
the management factor would be 1.66. Thus the management adjusted index 
would be elevated to 21.96. The units of this index would not remain as persons 
affected per 100 years. The index has now embodied the qualitative 'software' 
elements of the site. The index is potentially more useful in the information it 
contains. In this example, the problems associated with having poorly trained 
staff are amplified. In the example 2 of the software output (see Appendix 5), 
the frequency of the failure at the acid storage tanks was reduced to 0.13 by 
installing a PLC. While this aspect of the effect poorly trained staff have on a 
site has been negated, the implementation of the management factor will still 
note that the staff are poorly trained and have the capacity to elevate the hazard 
index. This is an important point to note, that 'software' and 'hardware' failures 
will usually work independently, so that only rectifying the source of the 
problem will alleviate its effects. 
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The basic methodology, derived from the work of Tweeddale and Keey proved 
to a good base for this project. While the process of calculating hazard indices 
was simple, the contributing parts of the index were three prime contributors to 
the hazardousness of an industrial installation. Decisions made by the user on 
the magnitude of those factors use would improve their perspective of the 
hazards involved. 
The software designed, using the methodology analysed a site quickly and a 
gave a useful hard copy of result data. The Whazan II software provided raw 
consequence data for the derivation of serious effect distances in a form that 
was easy to relate to the set vulnerability criteria, although it does not deal with 
hazards such as dust explosions. 
Analysis of effect area overlaps allowed a better perception of the hazard index, 
regarding the relationship between compartment hazardousness to the site 
topography. The use of a non-~form distribution of the target impact group 
forced a distinction between the risk part of the index and the outcome on that 
target group. Risk could be uniformly distributed within the area described by 
the effect radius, but the target group remained as discrete units. This meant 
that while risk could be attributed to areas defined on the site, the 
hazardousness could only be attributed to the hazard causing compartment. 
When the project hazard indices for the test site were compared with Dow Fire 
and Explosion Indices for the same site, a favourable comparison was made. It 
was recognised that the Dow index had minimal contribution for toxic effects, 
thus a direct comparison of indices was not particularly useful. However, 
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application of both methods was useful in comparing their approach, execution 
and respective limiting factors. The Dow index is based on a wealth of 
experience in the Dow Chemical Corporation. The analyses and correlations 
with the Dow Fire and Explosion Index method, are based on the corporation's 
experience, and are thus somewhat arbitrary. The arbitrary approach means 
that the results are with certain bounds of empirical expectation. This coupled 
with the structured, multiple element approach, means that the method is 
extremely reliable and that resultant index data is highly reproducible. 
The project software gives realistic results. The main aim of a ranking process is 
to provide a means of prioritising hazards in workplace so that resources can be 
allocated to most effectively control those hazards. The project software has the 
ability to measure the impact of toxic hazards, and more importantly gives an 
impression of the risk involved, through its use of a time related element in the 
frequency of failure. Risk sets the basis for prioritisation in these matters. The 
Dow index is more of a loss prevention system, as its final analysis works 
toward assessing property damage and the resulting costs. With only the 
impact on persons considered, the project software is a safety package only. 
However, analysis techniques regarding property damage assessment, similar 
to those within the Dow method could be integrated into the project software 
for that purpose. 
Overall, the software satisfies the initial aims of the project, in that it responds to 
the needs of the breadth of New Zealand industries. It is simple to use, can run 
on a minimal amount of computer hardware (as an executable file) and 
provides hard copy output. The results from the software analysis can be used 
to identify hazardous areas or compartments on site. The graphic image 
capability on the screen and hard copy enables the user to see if several of these 
compartments are agglomerated in a certain area on the site. Thus, the basic 
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requirements of a rapid ranking method are satisfied. Hazards can be 
effectively prioritised, as an indication of their effects has been gained. 
The software produced is not perfect, nor is it instantly ready for marketing as a 
hazard appraisal system for smaller New Zealand industries. The software has 
been written as a tool for analysis of the methodology in this project. An 
attempt has been made at user-friendliness, but by no means the degree 
necessary for commercial exploitation. The programming software could also 
be changed to a more sophisticated type, which would ease any cosmetic 
changes mentioned earlier. 
The prime value of the project software is that it provides a base for further 
development and testing of rapid ranking software. Further investigation could 
use the suggestions mentioned in this thesis. It successfully embodies the 
project aims and could be useful to industry and regulatory authority alike. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Consequence Tables 
TABLE A1.1 Consequences of Heat Radiation 
(Dept of Environmental Planning 1986) 
Heat Radiation (kW/m2) Effect 
1.2 Received from the sun at noon in summer. 
2.1 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute. 
4.7 Will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 
30 seconds exposure (will cause 2° burns). 
12.6 30% chance of fatality for continuous exposure. 
Will cause the temperature of wood to increase to 
a point where it can be ignited by a naked flame 
after long exposure. 
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from 
the fire may reach a thermal stress level high 
enough to cause structural failure. 
23 100% chance of fatality for continuous exposure 
to people and 10% chance of fatality for 
instantaneous exposure. 
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long 
exposure. 
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress 
temperatures sufficient to cause failure. 
Pressure vessel will need to be relieved or failure 
would occur. 
35 Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within 1 
minutes exposure. 
25% chance of fatality if people are exposed 
instantaneously. 
60 100% chance of fatality for instantaneous 
exposure. 
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TABLE A1.2 Effects of Explosion Overpressure 
(Dept of Envirorunental Planning 1986) 
Explosion Overpressure Effect 
3.5 kPa (0.5 psi) 90% glass breakage. 
No fatalities and very low probability of 
injury. 
7.kPa (1 psi) Damage to internal partitions and 
joinery, but can be prepared. 
Probability of injury is 10%, no fatality. 
14 kPa (2 psi) House uninhabitable and badly 
cracked. 
21 kPa (3 psi) Reinforced structures distort. 
Storage tanks fail. 
20% chance of fatality to a person in a 
building. 
35 kPa (5 psi) House uninhabitable. 
Wagons and plant items overturned. 
Threshold of eardrum damage. 
50% chance of fatality for a person in a 
building and 15% chance of fatality fro a 
person in the open. 
70 kPa (10 psi) Threshold of lung damage. 
100% chance of fatality for a person in a 
building or in the open. 
Complete demolition of houses. 
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Appendix 2. Software listing - Hazrank 
To aid the interpretation of the software, refer to Appendix 3 for a list of 
variable explanations and Appendix 4 for a quick reference of subroutine 
explanations. 
REM INTRODUCTION, INITIAUSE AND TITLE 
GOSUBSTART 
REM ENTER RELEVANT DATA 
GOSUB ENTERSITE 
GOSUB INPUTPEOPLE 
GOSUB ENTERCOMP 
REM MAIN LOOP FOR INDEX CALCULATION 
GOSUB ENTFREQ 
REM PRINTS REPORT TO SCREEN AND CLIPBOARD 
GOSUBFINAL 
END 
START: 
REM INITIAUSE 
d=O:pi=3.1416 
DIM cx(20),cy(20), rad(20),yy(20),xx(20) 
DIM com$(20), num(20), pers(20), px(20), py(20) 
DIM fredis$(15),freval(20),freq(20), sh(20) 
DIM hi(20), fa(20), fm(20), mit(20), mitdis$(20), mitpro(20) 
REM READ IN DATA STATEMENTS 
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FOR i=1 TO 7: READ fredis$(i):READ freval(i):NEXT i 
FOR i=1 TO S:READ mitdis$(i):READ mitpro(i):NEXT i 
REM TITLE PAGE 
CLS 
LOCATE 4,9:PRINT "HAZARD RANKING ANALYSIS SOFTWARE" 
LOCATE 8,12:PRINT "by Kevin Sanders" 
LOCATE 18,38:PRINT "press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$ <>" ":WEND 
CLS:PRINT :PRINT :INPUT"PLEASE ENTER NAME OF SITE";site$ 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
CLS 
RETURN 
ENTERSITE: 
REM ENTER SITE BOUNDARY COORDINATES 
WHILE q$<>"n" 
d=d+1:flag=1 
WHILE flag= 1 
flag=O 
LINE (0,0)-(495,262),0,bf 
d=d-1:GOSUB GRIDPRT:d=d+1 
LOCATE 17,30:INPUT"Please enter x coord";xx(d) 
LOCATE 18,30:INPUT"Please enter y coord";yy(d) 
IF xx(d) >10 OR xx(d)<O THEN flag=1 
IF yy(d) >10 OR yy(d)<O THEN flag=1 
LINE(0,230)-(495,295) ,O,bf 
IF flag=1 THEN PRINT "value outside, repeat entry" 
WEND 
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CLS: GOSUB GRIDPRT 
LOCATE 18,5: INPUT"another point to add";q$ 
IF q$=''N" 1HEN q$="n" 
CLS 
WEND 
d=d+1:xx(d)=xx(1):yy(d)=yy(1) 
GOSUB SITEPRINT 
LOCATE 18,5:PRINT "COMPLETED SITE" 
LOCATE 18,30:PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<>" ":WEND 
REM CHANCE TO CHANGE BOUNDARY COORDINATES 
WHILE c<d:CLS 
PRINT :PRINT "Opportunity to change site boundary coordinates" 
PRINT :PRINT "code","x coord","y coord": 
F0Ra=1 TOd 
PRINT a,xx(a),yy(a):NEXT a 
PRINT :PRINT "enter ";d+1;" for no corrections" 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT 
INPUT" enter code of coordinate you wish to change";c 
INPUT"enter x coordinate (return for no change)";xx(c) 
INPUT"enter y coordinate (return for no change)";yy(c) 
WEND 
REM ENTER OTHER SITE INFORMATION 
CLS: PRINT "INPUT ANCILLARY INFORMATION" 
PRINT :INPUT"How many metres per horizontal grid";me 
PRINT:INPUT"Which direction is north (0 degrees is straight up)";bear 
sc=44/me 
REM CALC APPRO X SITE AREA 
ltx=xx(1):lty=yy(1):rbx=xx(1):rby=yy(1) 
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FORa =2TOd 
IF xx(a)<ltx THEN ltx=xx(a) 
IF xx(a)>rbx TIIEN rbx = xx(a) 
IF yy(a)<lty THEN lty=yy(a) 
IF yy(a)>rby TIIEN rby =yy(a) 
NEXT 
are=(rbx-ltx)*(rby-lty)*1056*(mel 44)"2 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
RETURN 
INPUTPEOPLE: 
REM PLACE WORKERS ON SITE 
CLS 
LOCATE 5,6:PRINT "This program allows the situation of personnel on " 
LOCATE 6,6:PRINT "site in two ways, First, you may place discrete" 
LOCATE 7,6:PRINT "'clumps' of people on site, near where they actually" 
LOCATE 8,6:PRINT "work. For those with no fixed workplace, a uniform " 
LOCATE 9,6:PRINT "distribution shall be assumed, over a" 
LOCATE 10,6:PRINT "representative area." 
PRINT :PRINT :INPUT"How many workers on site in total";tot 
PRINT :INPUT "How many workers do you wish to place in discrete 
positions ";d tot 
utot=tot-dtot:tott=O: ntot=O 
PRINT :PRINT "There are ";utot; "workers to be placed uniformly on site," 
INPUT"how many of these will represent workers on site for 24hrs per day";stot 
dens=(stot+( utot-stot) I 4) I are:CLS 
WHILE ntot<dtot 
LINE(0,0)-(495,262),0,bf: GOSUB GRIDPRT 
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GOSUB DRAWPERS 
tott=tott+ 1 
sh(tott)=1 
LOCATE 17,4:INPUf"x coord (personnel)";px(tott) 
LINE (200,250)-(495,295),0,bf 
LOCATE 18,4:INPUf"y coord (personnel)";py(tott) 
LOCATE 17,30:INPUf"how many people";num(tott) 
LOCATE 18,30:INPUf "are sites filled 24hr";q$ 
IF q$=''N" OR q$="n" THEN sh(tott)=.25 
ntot=ntot+num(tott):LINE(0,250)-(495,295),0,bf 
LOCATE 18,30:PRINT "number accounted for = ";ntot 
WEND 
CLS: GOSUB GRIDPRT 
GOSUB DRAWPERS 
LOCATE 18,30:PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
RETURN 
ENTERCOMP: 
REM PLACE COMPARTMENTS ON SITE 
CLS: PRINT :PRINT :INPUT"How many compartments";n 
CLS:FOR k = 1 TO n 
flag=1 
WHILE flag= 1 
flag=O 
LINE( 0 ,0)-( 495,262) ,0 ,bf 
GOSUB GRIDPRT: k=k-1: GOSUB COMPTPRT: k=k+1 
LOCATE 17,30:INPUf"Please enter x coord";cx(k) 
LOCATE 18,30:INPUf"Please enter y coord";cy(k) 
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IF cx(n)>lO OR cx(n)<O 1HEN flag=l 
IF cy(n)>lO OR cy(n)<O 1HEN flag=l 
LINE (0,230)-(495,29S),O,bf 
IF flag=11HEN PRINT "value outside, repeat entry" 
WEND 
CLS:GOSUB COMPTPRT 
NEXTk 
CLS: GOSUB GRIDPRT 
k=n:GOSUB COMPTPRT 
LOCATE 18,1:PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<>" ":WEND 
REM ENTER COMPARTMENT PROCESS INFORMATION 
FOR i=l TO n:CLS:PRINT 
PRINT "COMPARTMENT ";i 
PRINT :INPUT"Please enter name of compartment";com$(i) 
PRINT :INPUT"Please enter hazard radii (in meters)";rad(i) 
NEXTi 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
RETURN 
ENTFREQ: 
REM FAILURE FREQUENCY TABLE 
FORi=l TOn 
CLS:PRINT :PRINT 
PRINT "COMPARTMENT NUMBER";i;": ";com$(i):PRINT 
PRINT "FREQUENCY SCALE FOR INITIATION OF INCIDENTS" 
PRINT''Number","Descriptor","Numerical Value (per lOOyrs)" 
PRINT :FOR f= 1 TO 7 
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PRINT f,fredis$(f),freval(f):NEXT f 
PRINT 
INPUT"Please enter number corresponding to chosen frequency";freq(i) 
REM MITIGATION PROBABILITY TABLE 
CLS:PRINT :PRINT 
PRINT "COMPARTMENT NUMBER";i;": ";com$(i):PRINT 
PRINT "MITIGATION PROBABILffiES OF FAILURE" 
PRINT "Number","Chance of Effective Response","Probability" 
PRINT :FOR p=l TO 5 
PRINT p,mitdis$(p),mitpro(p) 
NEXTp 
PRINT :INPUT"Please enter number corresponding to chosen probability";x 
mit(i)=x 
NEXTi 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
RETURN 
FINAL: 
REM PREPARE AND PRESENT OUTPUT DATA 
CLS:PRINT 11 ":PRINT II II :PRINT " " 
GOSUB CALCINDICES: GOSUB SITEPRINT:GOSUB PRTRADII 
GOSUB DIMENSION: GOSUB ARROW: GOSUB DRAWPERS 
REM PRINT TO CLIPBOARD 
PICTURE ON 
LINE(0,0)-(0,295): LINE-(480,295):LINE-(480,0):LINE-(O,O) 
PRINT 11 ANALYSIS RESULT5-site output" 
GOSUB SITEPRINT :GOSUB PRTRADII 
GOSUB DIMENSION: GOSUB ARROW: GOSUB DRAWPERS 
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PICTURE OFF 
OPEN "clip:picture" FOR OUTPUT AS #1 
PRINT #1,PICTURE$ 
CLOSE #1 
LOCATE 18,1: PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> " ":WEND 
RETURN 
GRIDPRT: 
REM DRAW GRID 
LINE(40,20)-(480,260),b 
FORi= 40 TO 436 STEP 44 
y=18:nu=(i-40)/44:x=i-1: GOSUB numprint 
LINE (i,20)-(i,260):NEXT i 
FOR i=44 TO 236 STEP 24 
nu=(i-20)/24:x=36:y=i+3: GOSUB numprint 
LINE(40,i)-(480,i):NEXT i 
FORa=1 TOd 
LINE( (xx(a)*44) +39 ,(yy(a)*24)+ 19)-( (Xx(a)*44)+41,(yy(a)*24)+21) ,bf:NEXT a 
y=18:nu=1:x=476:GOSUB numprint:nu=O:x=480:GOSUB numprint 
y=262:nu=1:x=32:GOSUB numprint:nu=O:x=36:GOSUB numprint 
SITEPRINT: 
REM DRAW SITE BOUNDARY 
PSET(xx(1)*44+40, yy(1)*24+ 20) 
FORa=2TOd 
LINE -((xx(a)*44)+40,(yy(a)*24)+20):NEXT a 
RETURN 
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CO:MPTPRT: 
REM DRAW COMPARTMENTS ON SITE 
FORi=1 TOk 
LINE( ( cx(i}*44) +38,( cy(i}*24)+ 18)-( ( cx(i) *44)+42,( cy(i}*24) + 22) ,bf 
NEXTi 
RETURN 
CALClNDICES: 
REM CALCULATE lNDICES AND REPORT 
GOSUB EVALUATE 
OPEN site$ FOR OUTPUT AS #2 
siteindex=O 
CLS:PRlNT"HAZARD RANK ANALYSIS RESUL TS":PRlNT 
PRINT 
PRINT #2,"HAZARD RANK ANALYSIS RESULTS":PRlNT#2," II 
PRINT #2,"SITE ID = ";site$:PRINT #2," ":PRlNT#2,"" 
PRINT #2, "Number of people on site =";tot:PRlNT #2, " " 
PRINT #2, dtot;" people are place directly on site" 
PRINT #2,utot;" people are placed uniformly on site" 
PRINT #2," II 
FORi= 1 TOn 
fa(i)=freval(freq(i)):fm(i)=mitpro(mit(i)) 
hi(i)=pers(i}*fa(i}*fm(i) 
si teindex=siteindex+ hi(i) 
REM PRlNT TO SCREEN 
PRINT :PRlNT "COMPARTMENT# = ";i 
PRINT "compartment type= ";com$(i) 
PRINT "failure frequency= ";fa(i); " (events per 100yrs)" 
PRINT "mitigation probability= ";fm(i) 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
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PRINT "effect radii = ";rad(i);"m" 
PRINT "persons affected= ";pers(i) 
PRINT "hazard index = ";hi(i) 
REM PRINT TO DATA FILE 
PRINT #2," ":PRINT #2,"COMP ARTMENT # = ";i 
PRINT #2,"compartment type= ";com$(i) 
PRINT #2,"failure frequency= ";fa(i);" (events per 100yrs)" 
PRINT #2,"mitigation probability= ";fm(i) 
PRINT #2,"effect radii = ";rad(i);"m" 
PRINT #2,"persons affected= ";pers(i) 
PRINT #2,"hazard index= ";hi(i) 
NEXTi 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT" SITEINDEX = "; siteindex:PRINT 
PRINT#2, II II :PRINT#2, II II 
PRINT #2, "SITEINDEX = "; siteindex:PRINT#2, " " 
CLOSE #2 
PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
CLS 
RETURN 
EVALUATE: 
REM EVALUATE PEOPLE AFFECTED BY HAZARDS 
FORi=1 TOn 
pers(i)=O 
xdp=cx(i)*44+40:ydp=cy(i)*24+20 
FOR j= 1 TO tott 
IF SQR(((px(j)*44+40)-xdp)A2+((py(j)*24+20)-ydp)A2)<rad(i)*sc THEN 
pers(i) =pers(i) +num(j)*sh q) 
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NEXTj 
NEXTi 
FORi= 1 TOn 
arc(i)=pi*rad(i)/\2 
pers(i) =pers(i) +arc(i)*dens 
NEXTi 
RETURN 
PRTRADII: 
REM DRAW EFFECT RADII 
FOR1=1 TOn 
LINE( (ex (I) *44) +38,( cy(1)*24)+ 18)-( ( cx(l)*44)+42,( cy(l)*24) + 22) ,bf 
CIRCLE( cx(l)*44+40 ,cy(1)*24+ 20) ,rad(l)*sc 
xhs=cx(1)*44 +34 
yhs=cy(l)*24+29 
LINE(xhs,yhs)-(xhs+9,yhs-6),0,bf 
LINE (xhs+ 1, yhs)-(xhs+ 1, yhs-4) 
LINE (xhs+3,yhs)-(xhs+3, yhs-~) 
LINE (xhs,yhs-1)-(xhs+4, yhs-1) 
LINE (xhs,yhs-3)-(xhs+4, yhs-3) 
x=xhs+6:y=yhs:nu=l 
GOSUB numprint 
NEXT I 
RETURN 
DRAWPERS: 
REM DRAW PERSONS ON SITE 
FOR i= 1 TO tott 
nu=num(i):x=px(i)*44+39:y=py(i)*24+ 23 
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LINE(x-2,y+3)-(x+6,y-7),0,bf 
IF nu<10 THEN GOSUB numprint 
IF nu>=lO THEN nux=nu:nu=INT(nu/10):GOSUB numprint:x=x+5:nu=nux-
nu*10:GOSUB numprint 
NEXTi 
RETURN 
DIMENSION: 
REM DRAW SCALE ON SITE 
r=20*sc 
xr=5:yr=150 
LINE(xr, yr-4)-(xr, yr) 
LINE -(xr+r,yr): LINE -(xr+r,yr-4) 
LINE(xr+r /2,yr)-(xr+r /2,yr-4) 
x=xr-1:y=yr-6:nu=O: GOSUB numprint 
x=xr+r/2+1: GOSUB numprint 
x=xr+r+1: GOSUB numprint 
nu=1:x=xr+r /2-4: GOSUB numprint 
nu=2:x=xr+r-4: GOSUB numprint 
ym=yr-6:xm=xr+r+8 
LINE(xm, ym-1)-(xm,ym-4) 
LINE(xm+2,ym-1)-(xm+2,ym-4) 
LINE(xm +8, ym-1)-(xm +8, ym-4) 
LINE(xm+4,ym-1)-(xm+4,ym-3) 
LINE(xm+6,ym-1)-(xm+6,ym-3) 
PSET(xm+1,ym): PSET(xm+7,ym): PSET(xm+1,ym-5) 
PSET(xm+7,ym-5): PSET(xm+3,ym-3):PSET(xm+5,ym-3) 
RETURN 
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ARROW: 
REM DRAW BEARING ON SITE 
xa=28:ya=100 
thet=bear I 57.29 
xh=20*SIN(thet):yh=20*COS(thet) 
LINE (xa,ya)-(xa+xh,ya-yh) 
xn=xa+ 1.3*xh: yn=ya-1.3*yh 
REM PRINT ARROW HEAD 
xal=3*SIN(thet+.785): ya1=3*COS(thet+.785) 
xar=3*SIN(thet-.785): yar=3*COS(thet-.785) 
LINE(xa+xh-xar,ya-yh+yar)-(xa+xh,ya-yh) 
LINE -(xa+xh-xal,ya-yh+yal) 
REM PRINT "N" FOR NORTH 
PSET(xn,yn): PSET(xn,yn-1): PSET(xn,yn-2): PSET(xn,yn-3): PSET(xn,yn-4) 
PSET(xn+3,yn): PSET(xn+3,yn-1): PSET(xn+3,yn-2): PSET(xn+3,yn-3) 
PSET(xn+3,yn-4): PSET(xn+1,yn-3):PSET(xn+2,yn-2) 
RETURN 
numprint: 
REM DRAW SMALL NUMBERS ON SITE 
SELECT CASE nu 
CASEO 
PSET(x,y ):PSET(x+1,y): PSET (x+2,y) 
PSET(x,y-1):PSET(x,y-2): PSET(x,y-3) 
PSET(x,y-4):PSET(x,y-5):PSET(x+2,y-5): PSET(x+1,y-5) 
PSET(x+2,y-4): PSET(x+2,y-3): PSET(x+2,y-2):PSET (x+2,y-1) 
CASE1 
PSET(x,y):PSET(x+ 1,y):PSET(x+2,y) 
PSET(x+ 1,y-1):PSET(x+ 1,y-2):PSET(x+ l,y-3) 
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PSET(x+ 1,y-4):PSET(x+ 1, y-S):PSET(x,y-4) 
CASE2 
PSET(x, y):PSET(x+ 1, y):PSET(x+2,y) 
PSET(x,y-1):PSET(x+1,y-2):PSET(x+2,y-3) 
PSET(x+ 2, y-4):PSET(x+ 1, y-S):PSET(x, y-4) 
CASE3 
PSET(x, y):PSET(x+ 1, y) 
PSET(x+2,y-1):PSET(x+2,y-2):PSET(x+2,y-3) 
PSET(x+2,y-4):PSET(x+ 1, y-3):PSET(x+ l,y-5): PSET(x, y-5) 
CASE4 
PSET(x+2,y-5):PSET(x+2,y-4):PSET(x+2,y-3):PSET(x+2,y-2) 
PSET(x+2,y-1):PSET(x+2,y):PSET(x+1,y-2):PSET(x,y-2) 
PSET(x,y-3):PSET(x+ 1,y-4) 
CASES 
PSET(x, y-1):PSET(x+ l,y) 
PSET(x+2,y-1):PSET(x+2,y-2):PSET(x+2,y-3) 
PSET(x+1,y-3):PSET(x,y-3):PSET(x,y-4): PSET(x,y-5) 
PSET(x+1,y-5): PSET(x+2,y-5) 
CASE6 
PSET(x,y ):PSET(x+1,y): PSET (x+2,y) 
PSET(x,y-1):PSET(x,y-2): PSET(x,y-3): PSET (x+1,y-2) 
PSET(x,y-4):PSET(x,y-5):PSET(x+2,y-5): PSET(x+ 1,y-5) 
PSET(x+2,y-4):PSET(x+2,y-2):PSET (x+2,y-1) 
CASE7 
PSET(x+1,y): PSET(x+1,y-1):PSET(x,y-5):PSET(x+1,y-5):PSET(x+2,y-5) 
PSET(x+2,y-4):PSET(x+2,y-3):PSET(x+1,y-3):PSET(x+1,y-2) 
CASES 
PSET(x,y ):PSET(x+1,y): PSET (x+2,y) 
PSET(x,y-1):PSET(x,y-2): PSET(x,y-3): PSET (x+1,y-3) 
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PSET(x,y-4):PSET(x,y-5):PSET(x+2,y-5): PSET(x+1,y-5) 
PSET(x+2,y-4): PSET(x+2,y-3): PSET(x+2,y-2):PSET (x+2,y-1) 
CASE9 
PSET(x,y-1):PSET(x+1,y): PSET (x+2,y-4) 
PSET(x+2,y-1):PSET(x+2,y-2): PSET(x+2,y-3) 
PSET(x+ 1,y-3):PSET(x,y-3):PSET(x,y-4): PSET(x,y-5) 
PSET(x+1,y-5): PSET(x+2~y-5): PSET(x,y): PSET(x+2,y) 
CASE ELSE 
LINE(200 ,280)-(202,282) ,bf 
END SELECT 
RETURN 
REM DATA FILES 
DATA Very Often ,1000,0ften ,100 
DATA Likely,10,Possible,1,Unlikely,0.1,Very Unlikely,O.Ol 
DATA Barely Credible,0.001 
DATA Negligible,1,Low,0.8,Fair,0.5 
DATA Good,0.2,Excellent,O 
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Appendix 3. Variable explanations 
Variable I String Explanation 
a loop variable in SITEPRINT 
arc() area covered by effect of each compartment 
are area of over which uniform personnel density is calculated 
bear input of bearing (in degrees) 
c coordinate chan_g_e variable in ENTERSITE 
com$() name of compartment 
ex(), cy() coordinates of compartments 
d number of sides to site boundary 
dens uniform personnel density_ 
dtot number of personnel to be placed in discrete positions on site 
f associated code for failure frequency table 
fa() frequency of failure for component 
flag flag variable to validate input data in ENTERSITE and 
ENTERCOMP 
fm() mitigation probability for component 
fredis$0 array for frequency descriptors 
freq() frequency number for compartment 
freval() array for frequen_gr.values 
hi() hazardindexforcom~artment 
i generic variable for loops throughout software 
j loop variable in EVALUATE 
k loop variable in ENTERCOMP 
1 loop variable for PRTRADII 
ltx, lty top left x and y coordinates of area used for calculating 
uniform personnel density 
me meters per horizontal grid 
mit() mitigation number for compartment 
mit dis$() mitigation descriptor string 
mitpro() mitigation probability string 
n number of compartments 
ntot number of workers accounted for so far in input:erocess 
nu case number for NUMPRINT 
num() number of people at a certain personnel site 
nux variable in ORA WPERS for second digit in agglomerations of 
more than 10 people 
p association code for mitigation probability table 
pers() persons affected by hazards from compartment 
pi constant of 1t ( = 3.1416) 
px(),py() coordinates for personnel locations 
q$ generic question string 
r pixel length of 20m in DIMENSION 
rad() effect radii for each compartment 
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rbx, rby bottom right x and y coordinates of area used for calculating 
uniform density 
sc scale, pixels per meter 
sh() the multiplier differentiating between day and shift work 
site$ name of site 
siteindex hazard index summation variable for entire site for all hi(i) 
stot the number of uniformly distributed people in 24hr jobs 
thet bearing (converted to radians) 
tot total number of workers on site 
tott number of personnel locations 
utot number of personnel to be uniformly placed on site 
x, y coordinates for the NUMPRINT routine, placing small 
numbers. 
xa,ya coordinates for base of ARROW 
xal, yal left tip of ARROW 
xar, yar right tip of ARROW 
xdp,ydp pixel derivative for grid coordinates of compartments 
xh,yh coordinates for ARROW head 
xhs, yhs coordinates for compartment identifier 
xm,ym coordinates of (m) in DIJ\.1ENSION 
xn,yn coordinates for letter N in ARROW 
xr,yr coordinates for scale in DIJ\.1ENSION 
xx(), yy() site boundary coordinates 
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Appendix 4. Subroutine Explanations 
SUBROUTINE NAME EXPLANATION 
ARROW ARROW draws an arrow showing the direction of 
North. The angle of the arrow is entered in 
ENTERSITE. and is only shown in the final report 
I printout. 
CALClNDICES This routine groups data and calculates hazard 
indices for each compartment. It is controlled by 
FINAL routine. 
COMPTPRT COMPTPRT draws small filled black squares where 
the compartments are on site. 
DIMENSION After entry of distance per horizontal grid length in 
ENTERSITE, this routine prints out a scale for the 
final report showing how long 20 meters is. 
DRAWPERS Draws the situation of personnel agglomerations on 
site, along with the number at each coordinate. 
ENTERCOMP Enters the coordinates of process compartments onto 
the site and grid. 
ENTERSITE This routine accepts data for the shape of the site 
boundary. Data is entered onto a 10x10 giid. 
ENTFREQ This routine presents tables showing failure· 
frequency and mitigation probability choices. These 
choices form two of the indices that comprise the 
hazard index. 
EVALUATE Evaluates the numbers of people affected by each 
compartment hazard. 
FINAL FINAL prepares the summary output data, 
coordinates output to the screen, clipboard (for 
diagrams) and to an output data file (for report 
information summary). 
GRIDPRT Draws the 10 x 10 grid upon which site data is 
entered. Small numbers for grid entry are taken from 
NUMPRINT. 
lNPUTPEOPLE Inputs the coordinated for the discrete positioning of 
personnel onto the site. 
NUMPRINT This is a generic routine that prints small numbers on 
screen at re_guired coordinates. 
PRTRADll This routine draws effect radii around the 
compartment coordinates. 
SITEPRINT SITEPRINT is tacked onto the end of GRIDPRT to 
print out just the site boundaxy, when re_guired. 
START This routine initialises variables, shows title box and 
reads relevant data from files at the end of the code. 
Appendix 5. Full Output from Hazrank Software 
example 1 
HAZARD RANK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
SITE ID = sulphuric acid productions 
Number of people on site= 25 
18 people are place directly on site 
7 people are placed uniformly on site 
COMP AR1MENT # = 1 
compartment type= sulphur melter 
failure frequency= 10 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 50 m 
persons affected= 1.010134 
hazard index = 5.050669 
COMPARTMENT#= 2 
compartment type= sulphur burner 
failure frequency= .1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .5 
effect radii = 80 m 
persons affected = 2.585943 
hazard index = .1292971 
COMP AR1MENT # = 3 
compartment type= LPG bullet 
failure frequency = .01 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .2 
effect radii= 180m 
persons affected = 15.59134 
hazard index = 3.118267E-02 
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COMPARTMENT # = 4 
compartment type= acid storage 
failure frequency= 100 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .2 
effect radii = 20 m 
persons affected= .6616214 
hazard index = 13.23243 
SITEINDEX = 18.44358 
ANALVS IS RESULTS-site output 
\ 
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Appendix 5. 
example 2 
HAZARD RANK AN A LYSIS RESULTS 
SITE ID = sulphuric acid productions 2 
Number of people on site = 25 
18 people are place directly on site 
7 people are placed uniformly on site 
COMPARTMENT#= 1 
compartment type= sulphur melter 
failure frequency= 10 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 50 m 
persons affected= 1.010134 
hazard index= 5.050669 
COMPARTMENT # = 2 
compartment type= sulphur burner 
failure frequency= .1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 80 m 
persons affected = 2.585943 
hazard index = .1292971 
COMPARTMENT#= 3 
compartment type= LPG bullet 
failure frequency= .01 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .2 
effect radii= 180m 
persons affected= 15.59133 
hazard index = 3.118267£-02 
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CO:MP ARTMENT # = 4 
compartment type= acid storage 
failure frequency= 1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .2 
effect radii = 20 m 
persons affected= .6616214 
hazard index = .1323243 
SITEINDEX = 5.343473 
\ 
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Appendix 5. 
example3 
HAZARD RANK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
SITE ID =sulphuric acid productions 3 
Number of people on site= 25 
18 people are place directly on site 
7 people are placed uniformly on site 
COMPARTMENT#= 1 
compartment type= sulphur melter 
failure frequency= 1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 50 m 
persons affected= 1.010134 
hazard index = .5050669 
COMPARTMENT#= 2 
compartment type= sulphur burner 
failure frequency= .1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 80 m 
persons affected = 2.585943 
hazard index = .1292971 
COMPARTMENT# = 3 
compartment type= LPG bullet 
failure frequency= .01 (events per lOOyrs) 
mitigation probability = .2 
effect radii = 150 m 
persons affected = 11.59121 
hazard index = 2.318241E-02 
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COI\1P AR1MENT # = 4 
compartment type= acid storage 
failure frequency= 100 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .2 
effect radii = 20 m 
persons affected= .6616214 
hazard index = 13.23243 
SITEINDEX = 13.88997 
AN~LYSI S RESUL TS-s1 te output 
\ 14 
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Appendix 5. 
example 4 
HAZARD RANK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
SITE ID =sulphuric acid productions 4 
Number of people on site = 25 
18 people are place directly on site 
7 people are placed uniformly on site 
COMPAR1MENT # = 1 
compartment type= sulphur melter 
failure frequency= 10 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .5 
effect radii = 50 m 
persons affected= 2.760134 
hazard index = 13.80067 
COMP AR1MENT # = 2 
compartment type= sulphur burner 
failure frequency= .1 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii = 80 m 
persons affected = 4.335942 
hazard index= .2167971 
COMP AR1MENT # = 3 
compartment type= LPG bullet 
failure frequency= .01 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability= .5 
effect radii= 180m 
persons affected = 17.34134 
hazard index = 8.670668E-02 
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COJ\1P ARTMENT # = 4 
compartment type= acid storage 
failure frequency= 100 (events per 100yrs) 
mitigation probability = .2 
effect radii = 20 m 
persons affected= .6616214 
hazard index = 13.23243 
SITEINDEX = 27.3366 
0 10 20 ~ 
I......I......J 
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Appendix 6. Interaction of Subroutines 
start 
gridprt 
I ~ numorint l siteprint v gridprt ~ numorint I f4o-~ entersite siteprint 
't siteprint 
inputpeop le drawpers l9o- numprint 
gridprt ~ numprint 
numprint 
gridprt ~ numprmt 
drawpers ~ numprint 
'~ gridprt Pf numorint I ~ siteprint 
entercomp ~; comptprint I 
gridprt ~I numprint I 
siteprint 
~~~ 1 comptprint 
entfreq (output to screen and dataftle) 
calcindices ~ evaluate 
siteprint 
~~ v prtradi 1 dimension ~ numprint 
final arrow ~ drawpers M numprmt siteprint (output to c/tpboard) 
prtradii 
dimension ~ numprint 
arrow 
drawpers <->f numprint 
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Appendix 7. Proof of calculation of area of overlap between two circles 
Consider two circles A and Bin Figure 1. The radius of A is ra, the radius of B is 
rb. The point at x denotes the top intersection of the two circles. 
Figure A7.1 
The the area of overlap is calculated by adding the areas of the two segments 
within the overlaps. 
Gieck (1985) gives the diagram in Figure A7.2 and equation (1) for the 
calculation of a segment of a circle; . 
Figure A7.2 
.. 
.. 
.. , 
.. a. , .. , 
.. , r ',,~,; 
.. , 
"' 
(1) 
A simplification of the geometry in Figure A7.1 can be seen in Figure A7.3; 
Figure A7.3 
From basic trigonometry; 
y = ra.Sin0a = rb.Sin0b (2) 
and ab = ra.Cos0a + rb.Cos0b (3) 
The solving of equations (2) and (3) simultaneously will give values for 0a and 
0b. The method for calculation is in the program Theta. 
Equating Figures A7.2 and A7.3; 
s = 2.y = 2.ra.Sin0a (or 2.rb.Sin 0b), (a= 2.0) (4) 
h = r- r. cos0 = r( 1-Cos0) (5) 
(ha and hb calculated for both 0a and 0b) 
Therefore the areas of the segments can each be calculated using equation (1). 
Software has been written to calculate the overlap area. A description can be 
found in Appendix 8 and a listing in Appendix 9 
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Rules of overlap. 
When writing computer software to perform a task, it is important that the 
software is able to recognise all cases and able to use the appropriate method to 
complete the task. This means that rules must be described for all cases. 
Detailed below are rules for the calculation of the overlap area between two 
circles. 
Consider the overlap of two circles in Figure A7.4, A and B. 
Figure A7.4 
The basis for this analysis is that ra ~ rb 
overlap= ra + rb- ab 
rule 1 
if overlap ~ 0 then no overlap 
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rule2 
if ab ~ ra-rb then circle B is totally within circle A and Area overlap= 1tl'b2 
rule 3 
There is a change to the technique if 0b>90°, i.e. in the case of Figure A7.5; 
Figure A7.5 
The central triangle in the middle of the overlap area looks like Figure A7.6; 
0a 
0b 
Figure A7.6 
The basic equations used in the method to calculate overlap areas were; 
y = ra.Sin0a (1) 
and y = rb.Sin 0b (la) 
From the diagram, it looks as if the equation should read; 
y = rb.Sin0c (lb) 
0c = 180-0b and since Sin0 = Sin(180-0) for all0, equations (1) and (1a) 
remain an accurate representation of the geometry. 
The second equation used was; 
ab = ra.Cos0a + rb.Cos0b (3) 
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In this case (ra.Cos0a) is larger than (ab), but (rb.Cos0b) will be negative. Since 
Cos0 = -(Cos(180-0)) for a110, the triangle described by the points x and B and 
the line yin Figure 6 can be mirrored in the line y. This means that the result for 
(rb.Cos0b) will be equal to (ab-ra.Cos0a). Thus equation (4) also remains an 
accurate representation of the geometry. With both equations (1) and (3) 
remaining true to the situation the method discussed is appropriate for all 
situations. 
The only change for cases where 0b>90° will be that the segment off concern 
will be on the other side of the circle's centre point. 
Figure A7.7 
Instead of the overlap area being sum of the two segments defined (See Figure 
A7.7), the overlap area will be the area of the segment calculated by the area of 
the A circle plus (the total area of the B circle, minus the area defined in the 
segment calculation). 
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Appendix 8. Software to calculate areas of overlap. 
Theta is the software written to calculate the area of overlap between two 
circles. 
The software first requests the entry of the radii of the two circles in question 
and the distance between their centres. If the software were absorbed into the 
main hazard analysis software, the radii would be input from the effect radii 
calculated in the Whazan II software. The distance between their centres can be 
calculated from the co-ordinates at those points. 
This information is then taken into the iteration routine. The routine uses a loop 
to estimate a series of values for 0b and applies equation (1) to calculate 0a. 
Using both of 0a and 0b, an estimate of the length between the circle centres 
(ab) is calculated using equation (3). When the difference between the 
calculated values for ab and the input value changes sign, the iteration routine 
trips back to the main program. In the main program the difference between 
the calculated and estimated ab val~e are compared to an acceptable value (in 
this software, 0.1). If the difference between the two values is acceptable, the 
routine that calculates the area of overlap is called up, the results are printed to 
the screen and the software execution ends. If the difference is unacceptable, 
the increment used for iterating is reduced, the range of values for iteration is 
more closely defined around the point where the sign was changed. the 
iteration routine is the invoked again. 
There is a routine in the theta software called ARCSlN. It calculates the inverse 
sine of a value. It was necessary to write because the Microsoft Quick basic 
software has no set function for inverse trigonometric functions. In the routine, 
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a loop checks degree values between 0° and 90° in increments of 0.05 against the 
actual sine values until they are correct within an error of 0.001. 
Theta would be utilised in a separate program. This is because the iteration 
procedures make execution of an overlap analysis a long process (4-10 minutes 
for systems with four effect radii). The Hazard Ranking software would 
download all relevant data (compartment co-ordinates, radii, frequencies, 
probabilities and personnel locations) into a data file, which this software would 
then retrieve. The software would compare all radii with each other, two at a 
time. The larger radius would be assigned the A value. 
Appendix 9. Software listing - Theta printout 
Dll\1 x(100), s(100) 
pi=3.1416 
da=O:db= 180:dc= 10:delx=O 
del=200 
INPUT"please enter radius of A";ra 
INPUT"please enter radius of B";rb 
INPUT"please enter distance between A and B";ab 
WHILE del>.1 
GOSUB iter 
da=delx-dc:db=delx+dc:dc=dc/ 10 
WEND 
GOSUBfin 
REM CALCULATION OF OVERLAP AREA 
haa=ra -ra *COS( theta) 
hbb=rb-rb*COS(thetb) 
s=2*ra *SIN (theta) 
aaa=(haa/(6*s))*(3*haa"2+4*s"2) 
abb=(hbb I (6*s))*(3*hbb"2+4*s"2) 
att=aaa+abb 
PRINT :PRINT "Area A= ";pi*ra"2 
PRINT "Area B = ";pi*rb"2 
PRINT "Area of Intersection= ";att 
PRINT "please press space bar to continue" 
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WHILE INKEY$<> II ":WEND 
END 
iter: 
REM ITERATION TO FIND THETA AND THETB 
c=2:s(1)=0: flag = 0: n=O 
FOR p = da TO db STEP de 
thetb=p*pi I 180 
si=(rblra)*SIN(thetb) 
GOSUB arcsin 
x(c)=ra*COS(theta)+rb*COS(thetb) 
n=x(c)-ab 
IF n>O THEN s(c)=2 ELSE s(c)=l 
IF s(c)=2 AND s(c-1)=11HEN flag=1 
IF s(c)=1 AND s(c-1)=21HEN flag= 1 
PRINT p,x(c) 
IF flag=1 THEN delx=p: del =ABS(x(c)-ab): RETURN 
c=c+l 
NEXT 
RETURN 
fin: 
REM PRINT OUT THETA AND THETB 
PRINT :PRINT "thetb = ";delx 
si=(rb I ra)*SIN(delx*pi/ 180) 
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GOSUB arcsin 
PRINT "theta= ";theta*180/pi 
RETURN 
arcsin: 
REM ARCSINE ESTIMATION 
FOR i=O TO 90 STEP .05 
j=i*pi/180 
IF ABS(si-SIN(j))<.001 1HEN theta=i 
NEXTi 
theta=theta *pi I 180 
RETURN 
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Appendix 10. Flow Diagrams For Encoding Fault Tree Operations 
Figure A10.1. Procedure For Calculating Probability Of An Ineffective 
Response For Several Mitigation Devices 
evaluate Po 
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Figure A10.2. Procedure For Calculation Of Frequency Of Failure For Several 
Contributing Factors 
CALCULATE 
enter fo 
for each 
contribution; 
enter name 
enter Boolean 
operations 
for each, 
enter f() 
evaluate jo 
Appendix 11. Whazan II Results 
Dense Cloud Dispersion 
MATERIAL Sui. Dioxide 
INPUT DATA 
Effective release height (m) 5.000 
Release rate (kg/ s) 1 
Release duration (s) 120.0 
Dilution factor 2 
Wind speed (m/s) 3.000 
Ambient temperature (K) 293 
Surface roughness factor 0.2000 
Atmospheric stability (A-F) D 
Min cone of interest (vol %) 5.000 E-4 
RESULTS 
Max downwind effect distance (m) 1590 
Max Toxic Effect (fatality prob) 1 
Appendix li Whazan Results Sulphur Dioxide 
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Appendix 11 Whazan Results Sulphur Dioxide 
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1680 
Dense Cloud Dispersion 
MATERIAL 
INPUT DATA 
Effective release height (m) 
Mass released (kg) 
Dilution factor 
Wind speed (m/s) 
Ambient temperature (K) 
Surface roughness factor 
Atmospheric stability (A-F) 
Min cone of interest (vol %) 
RESULTS 
Max downwind effect distance (m) 
Max Toxic Effect (fatality prob) 
Hy. Sulphide 
5.000 
1.000 
10 
3.000 
325 
0.2000 
D 
1.5000 E-3 
240 
0.9998 
134 
135 
Appendix 11 Whazan Results Hydrogen Sulphide 
DENSE C~OUO DISPERSION 
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Appendix 11/ Whazan Results Hydrogen Sulphide 
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Flammable Mass (kg) 
Efficiency Factor 
Maximum Radius of Fireball (m) 
Duration Of Fireball (s) 
Distance to 1.60 kW /m2 (m) 
Distance to 4.00 kW /m2 (m) 
Distance to 12.5 kW /m2 (m) 
Distance to 37.5 kW /m2 (m) 
Propane 
INPUT DATA 
1666 
0.2000 
RESULTS 
34.38 
5.335 
269.0 
189.2 
106.0 
56.11 
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Appendix t1 Whazan Results LPG (Propane) 
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Material 
INPUT DATA 
Flammable Mass (kg) 
Efficiency Factor 
RESULTS 
Fireball/ Bleve Model 
Propane 
833 
0.2000 
Maximum Radius of Fireball (m) 27.29 
Duration Of Fireball (s) 4.234 
Distance to 1.60 kW jm2 (m) 237.4 
Distance to 4.00 kW fm2 (m) 151.7 
Distance to 12.5 kW jm2 (m) 85.03 
Distance to 37.5 kW /m2 (m) 45.10 
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Appendix 11 Whazan Results LPG (Propane) 
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Appendix f1 Whazan Results LPG (Propane) 
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Appendix 12. Software Listing - Management Factor Calculation 
FORi=1 TOS 
READ Des$(i):READ Rat(i) 
NEXT 
FOR j=1 TO 4:READ cl$(j):NEXT 
wf=.S 
tot=O 
FOR j= 1 TO 4:CLS 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT 
PRINT "Considering ";cl$(j):PRINT :PRINT 
GOSUBout 
INPUT"Please enter code of descriptor";co(j) 
tot=tot+ Rat( co(j)) 
NEXT 
IF tot=O THEN tot=.1 
mf=(1 I ( wf*tot)) 
PRINT :PRINT :PRINT "management factor =" ;mf 
WHILE INKEY$<>" ":WEND 
END 
out: 
PRINT "Code","Descriptor","Rating" 
PRINT 
FORi=1 TOS 
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PRINT i,Des$(i),Rat(i) 
NEXT 
PRINT:P~:P~ 
RETURN 
DATA Poor,O,Fair,0.2,Average,0.5,Good 
DATA 0.8,Excellent,1.0 
DATA training,maintenance 
DATA instrumentation 
DATA safety management 
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Appendix 14. Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT A 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX 
LOCATION OATE 
PLANT d 
:£v J phu·r,C Ae-1 I PROCESS UNIT EVALUATED BY 1 LP h bu 1/e-f 
I REVIEWED BY 
MATERIALS AND PROCESS 
MATERIALS IN PROCESS UNIT 
STATE OF OPERATION lBASIC MATERIALISI FOR MATERIAL FACTOR 
I -: START·UP = SHUT·OOWN = NORMAL OPERATION 
MATERIAL FACTOR (SEE TABLE I OR APPENDICES A OR B) Note reau1rements when umt temperature over 140'-F\ "/ I I I 
1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS PENALTY PENALTY I USED I 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 1 00 
; 
A. EXOTHERMIC CHEMICAL REACTIONS (FACTOR .30 to 1.25) I 
B. ENDOTHERMIC PROCESSES (FACTOR .20 to .40) I I 
C. MATERIAL HANDLING & TRANSFER (FACTOR .25 to 1.05) 0".5_ 0. <? I ' 
0. ENCLOSED OR INDOOR PROCESS UNITS I FACTOR .25 to .901 
E. ACCESS .35 o· .;c:; 
F. DRAINAGE AND SPILL CONTROL (FACTOR .25 to . 301 Gats . 0· 2? 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR iF•i 'l I .... 
2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS I 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 1.00 
A. TOXIC MATERIAL(SI (FACTOR 0.20 to 0.801 0·2 
8. SUB·ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE I <500 mm HgJ .50 
C. OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE = INERTED = NOT INERTED 
1. TANK FARMS STORAGE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS .50 I 
2. PROCESS UPSET OR PURGE FAILURE .30 I 
3. ALWAYS IN FLAMMABLE RANGE .80 : 
D. OUST EXPLOSION (FACTOR .25 to 2.001 (SEE TABLE Ill 
E. PRESSURE !SEE FIGURE 21 OPERATING PRE~SURE ::!LZ.Q_ ps1g RELIEF SETIING ~ ps1g () . ., ~ 
,. j_ f. 72-J::3... ~ O·S_R"' 0· 71 
F. LOW TEMPERATURE (FACTOR .20 to .301 o·z. 
G. QUANTITY OF FLAMMABLE.·UNSTABLE MATERIAL; QUANTITY /!2000 lbs .. H0= ;q.q ~ fcBTU/Ib 
I. LIQUIDS. GASES AND REACTIVE MATERIALS IN PROCESS (SEE FIG. 31 
2. LIQUIDS OR GASES IN STORAGE (SEE FIG. 41 
_O· .).5 
3. COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS IN STORAGE. DUST IN PROCESS (SEE FIG. Sl 
H. CORROSION AND EROSION (FACTOR .10 Ia .751 0·2 i 
I. LEAKAGE -JOINTS AND PACKING !FACTOR .10 to 1.501 0· I 
J. USE OF FIRED HEATERS ISEE FIG. 6) 
K. HOT OIL HEAT EXCHANGE SYSTEM (FACTOR .15 to 1.15IISEE TABLE 1111 
L ROTATING EQUIPMENT 
.so I 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR (F,I .... Sh ).. 
UNIT HAZARD FACTOR iF• x F, = F31 5·3b 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (F, x MF = F & Ell ) i 2. Cf 
FORM C-22380 R-4-87 (471-036) 6 
Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT B 
va) Emergency Power 
b) Cooling 
·/C) Explosion Control 
d) Emergency Shutdown 
e) Computer Control 
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTORS 
1. Process Control (C1) 
.98 f) Inert Gas 
.97 to· .99 g) Operating Instructions/ 
.84 to .98 Procedures 
.96 to .99 h) Reactive Chemical Review 
.93 to .99 
c1 Total 0 .q I * 
2. Material Isolation (C2) 
.94 to .96 
.91 to .99 
.91 to .98 
v a) Remote Control Valves .96 to .98 c) Drainage .91 to .97 
.98 b) Dump/Slowdown .96 to .98 /d) Interlock 
a) Leak Detection 
b) Structural Steel 
c) Buried Tanks 
d) Water Supply 
e) Special Systems 
C2 Total 0 .q io * 
3. Fire Protection (Ca) 
.94 to .98 v f) Sprinkler System~ 
.95 to .98 g) Water Curtains 
.84 to .91 h) Foam 
.94 to .97 i) Hand Extinguishers/Monitors 
.91 j) Cable Protection 
C3Value O·g-31' 
{r · oh J. V·S ::- 0·3.34) 
.74 to .97 
.97 to .98 
.92 to .97 
.95 to .98 
.94 to .98 
Credit Factor= C1 X C2 X Ca = . 0·13 Enter on Line D Below 
UNIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
A-1. F & El IJ?. ·9 
A-2. Radius of Exposure ft. 
A-3. Value of Area of Exposure $MM __________________ __ 
B. Damage Factor 
C. Base MMPD (A-3 X B) 
D. Credit Factor 0 ·"13 
$MM __________________ __ 
E. Actual MMPD (C X D) $MM -----------
F. Days Outage (MPDO) da 
G. Business Interruption Loss (BI) $MM __________ _ 
N Product of all factors used. 
BACK OF FOAM C-22380 A-4-87 (471-036) 
7 
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Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT A 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX 
LOC_A_n_o_N____________ IOATE I I 
PLANT ~"uJf}hvliC 1/-c rd I PROCESS UNIT L.£e~~<fJhvt Mr.:, He1 EVALUATED BY I REVIEWED BY 
MATERIALS AND PROCESS 
MATERIALS IN PROCESS UNIT 
STATE OF OPERATION 
: STAAT-UP ~ SHUT·OOWN = NORMAL OPERATION I
IBASIC MATEAIALIS) FOR MATERIAL P:AC70R 
r . I f-f v c/ t/ () a !j,.(') ..:;, u / 10 hI r;, ( 
·-MATERIAL FACTOR (SEE TABLE I OR APPENDICES A OR 81 Note rea01rements wnen un11 1emoerature over ·~oF\ 
1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS PENALTY 
BASE FACTOR 1 co 
A. EXOTHERMIC CHEMICAL REACTIONS I FACTOR .30 to I .251 
B. ENDOTHERMIC PROCESSES I FACTOR .20 to .40) 
C. MATERIAL HANDLING & TRANSFER (FACTOR .25 to 1.051 
D. ENCLOSED OR INDOOR PROCESS UNITS I FACTOR .25 to .90) o·b 
E. ACCESS 35 
F. DRAINAGE AND SPILL CONTROL oFACTOR .25 to .501 ___ Gats. 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS FAC70R iF• I 
2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 
A. TOXIC MATERIALiSJ (FACTOR 0.20 to 0.801 
B. SUB-ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE (.: 500 mm Hgl I 30 
C. OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE = INERTED = NOT INERTED 
I. TANK FARMS STORAGE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS 30 
2. PROCESS UPSET OR PURGE FAILURE 30 
3. ALWAYS IN FLAMMABLE RANGE 30 
D. DUST EXPLOSION (FACTOR .25 to 2.001 !SEE TABLE Ill 
E. PRESSURE 1SEE FIGURE 21 OPERATING PRESSURE-- ps1g RELIEF SETTING-- ps1g 
F. LOW TEMPERATURE (FACTOR .20 to .30) 
G. QUANTITY OF FLAMMABLE. UNSTABLE MATERIAL: QUANTITY __2_Q__ lbs .. Hc~~BTU!Ib 
I. LIQUIDS, GASES AND REACTIVE MATERIALS IN PROCESS (SEE FIG. 3) 
2. LIQUIDS OR GASES IN STORAGE (SEE FIG. 4) 
3. COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS IN STORAGE. DUST IN PROCESS !SEE FIG. 51 
H. CORROSION AND EROSION (FACTOR .10 to .751 
I. LEAKAGE- JOINTS AND PACKING (FACTOR. 10 to 1.50) 
J. USE OF FIRED HEATERS (SEE FIG. 6) 
K. HOT OIL HEAT EXCHANGE SYSTEM (FACTOR .15 to 1.15) (SEE TABLE Ill) 
L ROTATING EQUIPMENT (FI'Itf) 50 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR (F,) 
UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F, x F, = F, 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX iF, x MF = F & Ell 
FORM C-22380 R-4-87 (471-036) 6 
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Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT B 
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTORS 
1. Process Control (C1) 
i/ a) Emergency Power .98 f) Inert Gas 
b) Cooling .97 to .. 99 v'g) Operating Instructions/ 
c) Explosion Control .84 to .98 Procedures 
d) Emergency Shutdown .96 to .99 h) Reactive Chemical Review 
e) Computer Control .93 to .99 
C, Total 0· q b 
2. Material Isolation (C2) 
a) Remote Control Valves .96 to .98 c) Drainage 
b) Dump/Slowdown .96 to .98 d) Interlock 
C2 Total. _____ *
3. Fire Protection (Ca) 
v a) Leak Detection 
b) Structural Steel 
.94 to .9f\O·~'+)t) Sprinkler Systems 
.95 to .98 g) Water Curtains 
c) Buried Tanks .84 to .91 h) Foam 
d) Water Supply .94 to .97 v' i) Hand Extinguishers/Monitors 
e) Special Systems 
.91 j) Cable Protection 
C3 Value f;2 • a 0 
Credit Factor= C, X Cz X Ca = O·,g 64 Enter on Line D Below 
UNIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
A-1. F & El i 3--7.-J 
A-2. Radius of Exposure I I ~·-? ft. 
A-3. Value of Area of Exposure $MM 
B. Damage factor 
c. Base MMPD (A-3 X B) ~), 8 61- $MM D. Credit Factor 
E. Actual MMPD (C X D) $MM 
F. Days Outage (MPDO) 
G. Business Interruption Loss (BI) $MM 
*Product of all factors used. 
BACK OF FORM C-22380 R-4-87 (471.Q36) 
7 
.94 to .96 . 
. 91 to .99 ( oqg-) 
.91 to .98 
.91 to .97 
.98 
.74 to .97 
.97 to .98 
.92 to .97 ) 
.95 to .98( o· 96 
.94 to .98 
da 
148 
Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT A 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX 
LOCATION OATE 
PLANT AEVIEWEO BY 
Sv/ 
\.iATERIALS iN PROCESS UNIT 
:Sui phvr r7 rc!X;c/e 
STATE OF OPERATION JBASIC MATEAIALISI FOR MATERIAL FACTOA I 
: STAAT·UP : St<UT·OOWN : NORMAL OPERATION I 
MATERIAL FACTOR 1SEE TABLE I OR APPENDICES A OR 8) Note reQUirements wnen unll temoerature over 140 Fl ) ! 
1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS PENALTY I PENALTY I USED 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 I 1 00 
I 
A. EXOTHERMIC CHEMICAL REACTIONS !FACTOR .30 to 1.25) I 0_ . 5: I : I 
3. ENDOTHERMIC PROCESSES !FACTOR .20 to .40) I 
C .. 1M TERIAL .~ANOLING & TRANSFER (FACTOR .25 10 1.05) I I I 
D. ENCLOSED OR INDOOR PROCESS UNITS I FACTOR .25 to .90) I i 
E. ACCESS .35 I I i 
F. DRAINAGE AND SPILL CONTROL 1FACTOR 25 lo .501 ___ Gals. i I ! 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR IF.t J•j 
2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS I I 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 I 1.00 I 
A. TOXIC MATERIAL!Sl (FACTOR 0.20 to 0.801 ()·4. I 
I I B. SUB-ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE I-.: 500 mm HgJ .so I 
C. OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE :: INERTEO :: NOT INERTEO I 
1. TANK FARMS STORAGE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS .50 I I I 
2. PROCESS UPSET OR PURGE FAILURE 30 i I I 
3. ALWAYS IN FLAMMABLE RANGE so i 
D. OUST EXPLOSION !FACTOR .25 to 2.00) (SEE TABLE II) I i 
E. PRESSURE !SEE: FIGURE 21 OPERATING PR.ESSURE -- ps1g RELIEF SETTING-- ps1g : 
F. LOW TEMPERATURE (FACTOR .20 to .301 I 
G. QUANTITY OF i'LAMMABLE.UNSTABLE MATERIAL: OUANTITY ___ Ibs., H0 = --- BTU/Ib 
I. LIQUIDS, GASES AND REACTIVE MATERIALS IN PROCESS (SEE FIG. 3) 
2. LIQUIDS OR GASES IN STORAGE !SEE FIG. 4) 
3. COMBUS71BLE SOLIDS IN STORAGE. OUST IN PROCESS !SEE FIG. 51 
H. CORROSION AND EROSION (FACTOR .10 to .751 O· ~ 
I. LEAKAGE- JOINTS AND PACKING I FACTOR .10 to 1.50) 0 ·~ ·~ 
J. USE OF FIRED HEATERS ISEE FIG. 6) 
K. HOT OIL HEAT EXCHANGE SYSTEM I FACTOR .15 to 1.15) (SEE TABLE I ill 
L ROTATING EQUIPMENT 
.50 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR (F,) ·?. 7 
,;.- -
UNIT HAZARD FACTOR iF• x F, = F11 :s. -~ 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX (FJ x MF = F & Ell .., . .., 
..)' :.::> 
FORM C-22380 A-4-87(471.036) 6 
Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT 8 
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTORS 
a) Emergency Power 
b) Cooling 
c) Explosion Control 
v d) Emergency Shutdown 
e) Computer Control 
V a) Remote Control Valves 
b) Dump/Slowdown 
V' a) Leak Detection 
vb) Structural Steel 
c) Buried Tanks 
d) Water Supply 
e) Special Systems 
1. Process Control (C1) 
.98 f) Inert Gas 
.97 to .99 vg) Operating Instructions/ 
.84 to .98 Procedures 
.96 to .9~o.q-1),) Reactive Chemical Review 
.93 to .99 
C1 Total Q-q 7 
2. Material Isolation (C2) 
.96 to .98(0-f!k ~) Drainage 
.96 to .98 d) Interlock 
C2 Total Q. Cf b * 
3. Fire Protection (CJ) 
.94 to .98(0-tjs-)) Sprinkler Systems 
.95 to .98(01&/J) Water Curtains 
.84 to .91 h) Foam 
.94 to .97 i) Hand Extinguishers/Monitors 
.91 j) Cable Protection 
Ca Value 0· 9 I l * 
.94 to .96 
.91 to .9(o·9s) 
.91 to .98 
.91 to .97 
.98 
.74 to .97 
.97 to .98 
.92 to .97 
.95 to .98 
.94 to .98 
Credit Factor= C1 X C2 X Ca- (} ·8QS: Enter on Line D Below 
UNIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
A-1.F&EI 
A-2. Radius of Exposure ft. 
A-3. Value of Area of Exposure $MM ____________________ _ 
B. Damage Factor 
C. Base MMPD (A-3 X B) 
D. Credit Factor 
a ,.. • $MM ________ _ 
O· oOS 
E. Actual MMPD (C X D) $MM ------------
F. Days Outage (MPDO) da 
G. Business Interruption Loss (81) $MM __________________ __ 
• Product of all factors used. 
BACK OF FORM C-22380 A-4-87 (471.036) 
7 
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EXHIBIT A 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX 
LOCATION OATE 
?LANT d Sv/;J~VIIC .A-c1 EVALUATED BY I REVIEWED BY 
MATERIALS AND PROCESS 
MATERIALS IN PROCESS UNIT 
5 v (If ?t (I I 1 C f-}- C i 4 
STATE OF OPERATION BASIC MATERIALISI FOR MATERIAL "ACTOR 
: START·UP : SHUT-OOWN : NORMAL OPERATION 
MATERIAL FACTOR (SEE TABLE I OR APPENDICES A OR 8) Note reowemen1s wnen un11 temoerature over t40 F'1 
1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS PENALTY 
BASE FACTOR I 1.00 
A. EXOTHERMIC CHEMICAL REACTIONS I FACTOR .30 to 1.25) 
B. ENDOTHERMIC PROCESSES I FACTOR .20 to ,40) 
C. MATERIAL HANDLING & TRANSFER (FACTOR .25 to 105) 
D. ENCLOSED OR INDOOR PROCESS UNITS (FACTOR .25 to .90) 
E. ACCESS .35 
F. DRAINAGE AND SPILL CONTROL !FACTOR .25 to .SOl Gals. 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR IF!) 
2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
BASE FACTOR 1.00 
A. TOXIC MATERIAL(S) (FACTOR 0.20 to 0.80\ 
B. SUB·ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE ( <500 mm Hg) .SO 
C. OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE : INERTED : NOT INERTED 
1. TANK FARMS STORAGE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS .so 
2. PROCESS UPSET OR PURGE FAILURE .30 
3. ALWAYS IN FLAMMABLE RANGE .80 
D. DUST EXPLOSION (FACTOR .25 to 2.00) (SEE TABLE II) 
E. PRESSURE (SEE FIGURE 2\ OPERATING PRESSURE __ ps1g RELIEF SETTING-- ps1g 
F. LOW TEMPERATURE !FACTOR .20 to .30) 
G. QUANTITY OF FLAMMABLE UNSTABLE MATERIAL; QUANTITY ___ lbs .. He=--- BTU·Ib 
I. LIQUIDS, GASES AND REACTIVE MATERIALS IN PROCESS !SEE FIG. 3) 
2. LIQUIDS OR GASES IN STORAGE (SEE FIG, 4) 
3. COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS IN STORAGE, OUST IN PROCESS (SEE FIG. 5) 
H. CORROSION AND EROSION (FACTOR .10 to .75) 
1. LEAKAGE- JOINTS AND PACKING !FACTOR .10 to 1.50) 
J. USE OF FIRED HEATERS !SEE FIG. 6) 
K. HOT OIL HEAT EXCHANGE SYSTEM (FACTOR .15 to 1.15) !SEE TABLE Ill) 
L ROTATING EQUIPMENT -~ 
.SO 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR (F2) 
UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (Ft x Fz = F,, 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX IF, x MF • F & El) 
FORM C-22380 R-4-87 (471-036) 6 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
PENALTY 
USED 
1 00 
0·3 
c· ~"' 
1 ·bs 
1.00 
0·4 
0·5' 
I ·Cf 
":'. !7<;" ~ -~ 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
't 
! 
' 
! 
:J> J 3S 
Appendix 14 Dow Fire and Explosion Index Sheets 
EXHIBIT B 
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT FACTORS 
1. Process Control (C1) 
a) Emergency Power .98 . f) Inert Gas 
b) Cooling .97 to .99 g) Operating Instructions/ 
c) Explosion Control .84 to .98 Procedures 
d) Emergency Shutdown .96 to .99 h) Reactive Chemical Review 
e) Computer Control .93 to .99 
C1 Total. ____ _ 
.94 to .96 
.91 to .99 
.91 to .98 
152 
2. Material Isolation (C2) 
a) Remote Control Valves .96 to .98 c) Drainage 
b) Dump/Slowdown .96 to .98 d) Interlock 
.91 to .97 { 0 .qc;-) 
.98 
3. Fire Protection (CJ) 
a) Leak Detection .94 to .98 f) Sprinkler Systems .74 to .97 
b) Structural Steel .95 to .98 g) Water Curtains .97 to .98 
c) Buried Tanks .84 to .91 h) Foam .92 to .97 
d) Water Supply .94 to .97 i) Hand Extinguishers/Monitors .95 to .98 
e) Special Systems .91 j) Cable Protection .94 to .98 
CJ Value ____ _ 
. ,", .c, r 
Credit Factor= C1 X C2 X Ca = v · ') Enter on Line D Below 
UNIT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
A-1. F & El 
A-2. Radius of Exposure ft. 
A-3. Value of Area of Exposure $MM __________________ __ 
B. Damage Factor 
C. Base MMPD (A-3 X B) $MM __________________ __ 
D. Credit Factor 
E. Actual MMPD (C X D) $MM ----------
F. Days Outage (MPDO) da 
G. Business Interruption Loss (BI) $MM __________________ __ 
~Product of all factors used. 
BACK OF FORM C-22380 R-4-87 (471·036) 
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